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CriticalCISA KEVExploited in the wildPublic exploit

SQL Injection in Progress MOVEit Transfer

IdentifiersCVE-2023-34362CWE-89· Improper Neutralization of Special…

CVE-2023-34362 is a critical SQL injection vulnerability in the Progress MOVEit Transfer web application. It affects MOVEit Transfer versions prior to 2021.0.6 (13.0.6), 2021.1.4 (13.1.4), 2022.0.4 (14.0.4), 2022.1.5 (14.1.5), and 2023.0.1 (15.0.1), including older unsupported releases. The flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to reach the MOVEit Transfer application over HTTP or HTTPS and inject SQL against the backend database. Depending on the database engine in use (MySQL, Microsoft SQL Server, or Azure SQL), an attacker can infer database structure and contents and execute SQL statements that alter or delete database elements. Multiple reporting sources in the provided content further indicate the flaw was used in the wild to bypass authentication, gain unauthorized database access, deploy the LEMURLOOT web shell, create attacker-controlled users, enumerate and download files, and extract Azure Blob Storage configuration and secrets from compromised MOVEit environments.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation can result in full compromise of the MOVEit Transfer application environment. Reported impacts include unauthorized access to the MOVEit database, disclosure of sensitive stored files and database contents, modification or deletion of database records, creation of attacker-controlled accounts, extraction of credentials or secrets for configured Azure Blob Storage, and deployment of webshells for persistent access. In observed intrusions, the vulnerability was used for large-scale data theft and extortion operations affecting thousands of organizations and downstream third parties. The impact spans confidentiality, integrity, and potentially availability, with practical outcomes including unauthorized access to transferred files, supply-chain exposure, persistence, and follow-on compromise of connected storage resources.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If immediate patching is not possible, reduce exposure of MOVEit Transfer as much as possible. The provided content indicates exploitation occurs via HTTP or HTTPS against internet-facing web applications, so temporarily block or restrict web access, place the service behind a firewall, VPN, or SSO gateway, and avoid direct public internet exposure. Progress guidance cited in the content also recommended temporarily blocking HTTP access and relying on unaffected transfer methods where operationally feasible. Conduct urgent threat hunting for indicators of compromise, especially webshell artifacts, anomalous account creation, suspicious SQL activity, and unusual file access or exfiltration. Rotate relevant cloud keys and database credentials if compromise is suspected. These are temporary risk-reduction measures only; patching and incident response remain necessary.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade MOVEit Transfer to a fixed version provided by Progress. The content identifies fixed releases including 2021.0.6 (13.0.6), 2021.1.4 (13.1.4), 2022.0.4 (14.0.4), 2022.1.5 (14.1.5), and 2023.0.1 (15.0.1), and later vendor guidance also references subsequent patched builds for supported branches. In addition to patching, organizations should perform compromise assessment and cleanup because exploitation in the wild included webshell deployment and attacker-created accounts. Review IIS/web logs, application logs, database changes, and filesystem artifacts for indicators such as LEMURLOOT/human2.aspx-style webshells; remove malicious files; identify and delete unauthorized accounts; rotate database credentials and any Azure Blob Storage keys or other secrets exposed to MOVEit; and rebuild or restore from known-good state if compromise is confirmed. If rebuilding the web server, ensure the underlying database is also reviewed so attacker-created accounts do not persist.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

3 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (5 hidden).

VALID 3 / 8 TOTALView more in app
abyss-c2MaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository is a multi-module Python offensive framework centered on exploiting HiSilicon DVR/NVR/IP camera devices via CVE-2020-25078, then managing compromised hosts through a Flask/SocketIO web panel. It is not a simple single-file PoC: it includes a control server (server.py), persistence and post-exploitation tooling, credential attacks, recon modules, web vulnerability scanners, network service checks, pivoting, reverse shell support, and a SQLite-backed datastore. Core exploit logic is in exploit.py and scanner.py. exploit.py probes numerous traversal/disclosure paths such as /../../.../mnt/mtd/Config/Account1 and related config/system files, parses returned content with multiple regex patterns to recover credentials, fingerprints device families, and falls back to known default credentials when disclosure succeeds but parsing does not. scanner.py operationalizes this by scanning IPs/CIDRs and common ports, checking liveness, fingerprinting likely cameras, invoking the CVE-2020-25078 checks, and storing recovered credentials in cameras.db. Post-exploitation capability is substantial. telnet_client.py provides raw Telnet login and command execution. botnet.py fans out commands across stored hosts. persistence.py installs SSH authorized_keys, cron, rc.local, init.d, systemd, inittab telnetd, and bind-shell style persistence. reverse_shell.py generates many Linux/IoT reverse shell one-liners and runs listeners. pivot_chain.py and socks_pivot.py support chained execution and local SOCKS5 pivoting through compromised hosts. Additional modules broaden scope beyond the HiSilicon exploit: brute.py and cred_spray.py perform credential attacks across Telnet, SSH, FTP, HTTP, SMB, databases, VNC, LDAP, WinRM, and more; network_exploit.py checks for exposed/misconfigured services and some well-known vulnerabilities such as MS17-010 and BlueKeep; web_exploit.py, web_cves.py, web_bugs.py, and web_brute.py scan websites for exposed files, CMS fingerprints, generic bug classes, and multiple CVE signatures. Recon/intel support includes ASN, DNS, GeoIP, JARM, WAF detection, proxy/Tor rotation, screenshot grabbing from camera snapshot endpoints, and Telegram/Discord/AbuseIPDB integrations. The repository structure is coherent and functional, with many CLI-capable modules and a central web UI in templates/index.html. Overall, this is an operational exploit-and-post-exploitation toolkit focused on HiSilicon IoT devices but expanded into a broader C2-style offensive platform.

flags-altDisclosed May 20, 2026pythonhtmlnetworkweblocal
CVE-2023-34362MaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository provides a working proof-of-concept (POC) exploit for CVE-2023-34362, a critical SQL injection and remote code execution vulnerability in Progress MOVEit Transfer. The main exploit script (CVE-2023-34362.py) is a Python tool that automates the attack chain: 1. It first abuses a SQL injection in the guest access functionality to set arbitrary session variables and ultimately obtain a sysadmin API access token. 2. The exploit then uses this token to perform a deserialization attack during a file upload, resulting in remote code execution (RCE) on the MOVEit Transfer server. 3. The default payload writes a file to C:\Windows\Temp\message.txt, but the exploit can be customized to execute arbitrary commands using ysoserial.net-generated payloads. The repository includes supporting files: a certificate and private key (cert.crt, key.pem, key.pub) for forging JWTs required in the attack, and a provider_file.txt with example IDP metadata. The README.md provides technical background, usage instructions, and mitigation advice. The exploit targets unpatched MOVEit Transfer servers accessible over the network and requires interaction with specific web endpoints (/guestaccess.aspx and /moveitisapi/moveitisapi.dll). The attack vector is network-based, and the exploit is operational, providing a full attack chain from initial access to RCE.

horizon3aiDisclosed Jun 9, 2023pythonnetwork
CVE-2023-34362MaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository contains a Ruby exploit script (CVE-2023-34362.rb) targeting the MOVEit Transfer application, exploiting CVE-2023-34362. The exploit achieves unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) by chaining a SQL injection vulnerability with unsafe deserialization. The script performs the following steps: establishes a session, leverages SQL injection to plant a serialized .NET gadget (configured to spawn 'notepad.exe') in the database, and then triggers deserialization via a crafted API call, resulting in code execution on the server. The exploit also includes cleanup steps to remove indicators of compromise from the database. The main endpoints targeted are '/moveitisapi/moveitisapi.dll', '/guestaccess.aspx', and '/api/v1/folders/<folder_id>/files'. The repository consists of the exploit script and a detailed README explaining usage and exploitation flow. The exploit is operational, with a hardcoded payload, and is not part of a larger framework.

sfewer-r7Disclosed Jun 12, 2023rubynetwork
EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
Progress SoftwareMoveit Cloudapplication
Progress SoftwareMoveit Transferapplication

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, which detections to deploy, and what to do tonight.
Exposure mapping

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Threat actor evidence38

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware29

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures2

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity8

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.