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CriticalPublic exploit

Command Injection in D-Link IP Camera rtpd.cgi

IdentifiersCVE-2013-1599CWE-78· Improper Neutralization of Special…

CVE-2013-1599 is a command injection vulnerability in the /var/www/cgi-bin/rtpd.cgi CGI script used by multiple D-Link IP Camera models. Affected firmware versions include DCS-3411/3430 1.02, DCS-5605/5635 1.01, DCS-1100L/1130L 1.04, DCS-1100/1130 1.03, DCS-1100/1130 1.04_US, DCS-2102/2121 1.05_RU, DCS-3410 1.02, DCS-5230 1.02, DCS-5230L 1.02, DCS-6410 1.00, DCS-7410 1.00, DCS-7510 1.00, and WCS-1100 1.02. The flaw allows attacker-controlled input delivered through the camera web interface, including a crafted query string, to be incorporated into an OS command without proper neutralization, resulting in arbitrary command execution on the device.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows remote arbitrary command execution on the affected camera with the privileges of the vulnerable web/CGI process, which on embedded devices is often sufficient for full device compromise. An attacker can take control of the camera, alter configuration, disable services, install malware, conscript the device into a botnet, pivot within the local network, or disrupt surveillance operations.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Restrict access to the camera web interface to trusted management networks only; do not expose the interface directly to the internet. Place devices behind firewalls or VPNs, disable remote administration where not required, and enforce network segmentation for IoT/OT-style camera deployments. Monitor for unexpected outbound connections, process execution, or configuration changes indicative of post-exploitation botnet activity. If patching is unavailable, compensating controls should include ACLs, reverse-proxy filtering, and device replacement.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade affected D-Link IP Camera devices to vendor-fixed firmware if available. If no supported fixed firmware exists for a given model, replace the device with a supported product. Review vendor advisories for exact fixed versions by model, and verify that internet-exposed management interfaces are eliminated after upgrade. Because exploitation yields arbitrary command execution, devices believed to have been exposed should be treated as potentially compromised and reimaged/reset before being returned to service.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.

VALID 0 / 1 TOTALView more in app

All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
D-LinkDcs-1100 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-1100l Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-1130 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-1130l Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-2102 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-2121 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-3410 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-3411 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-3430 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-5230 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-5230l Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-5605 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-5635 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-6410 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-7410 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDcs-7510 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkWcs-1100 Firmwareoperating_system

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, which detections to deploy, and what to do tonight.
Exposure mapping

Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.

Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware2

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures1

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.