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Mallory
CriticalCISA KEVExploited in the wildPublic exploit

Unauthenticated RCE in Cisco Unified Communications Products Web Management Interface

IdentifiersCVE-2026-20045CWE-20

CVE-2026-20045 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability affecting Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM), Unified CM Session Management Edition (SME), Unified CM IM & Presence Service (IM&P), Cisco Unity Connection, and Cisco Webex Calling Dedicated Instance. The flaw is due to improper validation of user-supplied input in HTTP requests handled by the web-based management interface. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the issue by sending a sequence of crafted HTTP requests to the management interface of an affected device. Successful exploitation allows arbitrary command execution on the underlying operating system, resulting in user-level OS access; Cisco states this access can then be leveraged to elevate privileges to root. Cisco rated the issue Critical via its Security Impact Rating because exploitation can lead to full system compromise, and the vulnerability has been reported as actively exploited in the wild.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation permits unauthenticated remote execution of arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system of affected Cisco unified communications platforms. An attacker can gain user-level shell access and subsequently escalate privileges to root, enabling full device compromise. This can lead to takeover of voice and messaging infrastructure, unauthorized access to communications-related data and services, persistence on the appliance, service disruption, and use of the compromised system as an internal pivot point.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Cisco states there are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. If immediate patching is not possible, the only practical risk-reduction measures are to restrict exposure of the web-based management interface, limit network access to trusted administrative paths, and increase monitoring for suspicious HTTP requests and post-exploitation activity. These measures do not remediate the flaw and should not be treated as a substitute for vendor patches.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Apply Cisco-provided fixes immediately. For Unified CM, Unified CM SME, Unified CM IM&P, and Webex Calling Dedicated Instance, Release 14 is fixed in 14SU5 or by applying patch file ciscocm.V14SU4a_CSCwr21851_remote_code_v1.cop.sha512; Release 15 is fixed in 15SU4 or by applying patch files ciscocm.V15SU2_CSCwr21851_remote_code_v1.cop.sha512 or ciscocm.V15SU3_CSCwr21851_remote_code_v1.cop.sha512. For Cisco Unity Connection, Release 14 is fixed in 14SU5 or by applying patch file ciscocm.cuc.CSCwr29208_C0266-1.cop.sha512; Release 15 is fixed in 15SU4 or by applying patch file ciscocm.cuc.CSCwr29208_C0266-1.cop.sha512. Release 12.5 deployments must migrate to a fixed release. Because exploitation has occurred in the wild, organizations should also investigate affected systems for signs of prior compromise after patching.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).

VALID 2 / 3 TOTALView more in app
Ashwesker-CVE-2026-20045MaturityPoCVerified exploit

Repository contains a single Python PoC script and a README. The script (CVE-2026-20045.py) is a network-based, unauthenticated RCE attempt against Cisco Unified Communications web/management interfaces. It iterates over several hardcoded candidate paths (/cucm-uds/, /cmplatform/, /ucmuser/, /unity/, /webexcalling/ etc.), sending a Stage-1 GET request with a base64-encoded command-injection string placed into a `query` parameter. If the response looks promising (status 200/302/500 or lacks the word 'error'), it performs Stage-2 by POSTing to the same path with an `escalate` parameter and `cmd` form field containing base64-encoded `sudo -i; {command}` to try to obtain root execution. The operator supplies the command on the CLI, enabling behaviors like running system commands, spawning a reverse shell, or downloading/executing a remote script (as shown in README examples). The code disables TLS verification (verify=False) and sets X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1, suggesting an attempt to influence trust logic. Overall, this is a basic PoC with assumptions about both the injection point and privilege escalation; it is not a framework module and has minimal validation of actual command execution beyond HTTP status/response text.

dkstar11qDisclosed Jan 25, 2026pythonmarkdownnetwork (unauthenticated HTTP(S) command injection leading to RCE; follow-on privilege escalation via sudo assumption)
Ashwesker-CVE-2026-20045MaturityPoCVerified exploit

Repository contains a single Python proof-of-concept exploit script and a README. Structure: - CVE-2026-20045.py: Python script that takes a target base URL and an arbitrary shell command. It iterates over a list of common Cisco Unified Communications web/management paths and performs two stages of HTTP requests: 1) Stage 1 GET request to `<base><path>?query=<base64>` where the base64 decodes to a classic command-injection string `'; <command> #`. 2) Stage 2 POST request to `<base><path>?escalate=<base64>` with form data `cmd=<base64>`, where the base64 decodes to `sudo -i; <command>`. The script prints status codes and up to 1000 characters of response body as “possible command output”. TLS verification is disabled (verify=False) and it sets `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1`. - README.md: Marketing-style writeup and usage examples (id/whoami/uname, reverse shell via /dev/tcp, and curl|bash). Lists affected Cisco UC products. Exploit capabilities: - Network-based, unauthenticated attempt at remote command execution against multiple candidate web paths. - Operator-controlled command execution (can be used for reconnaissance, reverse shell, or download/execute depending on the provided command). - Claims root execution via a second-stage `sudo -i` escalation attempt, but does not implement a specific privilege-escalation vulnerability beyond assuming sudo access. Notable observables/fingerprintables: - Targeted paths: /cucm-uds/, /cucm-uds/users, /cmplatform/, /ucmuser/, /unity/, /webexcalling/. - Query parameters used as delivery vectors: `query` and `escalate`, plus POST form field `cmd`. - Headers: `User-Agent: ... CiscoExploit/1.0` and `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1`. Overall, this is a simple PoC-style command-injection driver that sprays a small set of likely Cisco UC web endpoints and attempts to run an arbitrary command, with a follow-up request that assumes sudo-based escalation to root.

AshweskerDisclosed Jan 22, 2026pythonmarkdownnetwork
EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
Cisco SystemsUnified Communications Managerapplication
Cisco SystemsUnified Communications Manager Im And Presence Serviceapplication
Cisco SystemsUnified Communications Productsapplication
Cisco SystemsUnity Connectionapplication

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, which detections to deploy, and what to do tonight.
Exposure mapping

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Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures2

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity108

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.