HTTP/2 request injection in NGINX ngx_http_proxy_module
CVE-2026-42926 is an HTTP/2 request injection vulnerability in NGINX Open Source/NGINX affecting the ngx_http_proxy_module when NGINX is configured to proxy upstream traffic over HTTP/2 using proxy_http_version 2 and also uses the proxy_set_body directive. Under these conditions, an unauthenticated remote attacker can cause NGINX to inject arbitrary HTTP/2 frame headers and payload bytes to the upstream peer. The issue is described by NGINX as affecting HTTP/2 proxying in conjunction with request-body rewriting via proxy_set_body. Fixed releases include nginx 1.30.1 (stable) and 1.31.0 (mainline).
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Impact, mitigation & remediation
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
Impact
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
Mitigation
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
proxy_set_body together with proxy_http_version 2 for upstream proxying. Where operationally feasible, proxy to upstreams using HTTP/1.1 instead of HTTP/2, or remove/replace the proxy_set_body usage on affected locations. Limit exposure of untrusted client traffic to affected reverse-proxy paths until patched.Remediation
Patch, then assume compromise.
Exploits
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a self-contained lab and validation harness for CVE-2026-42926, described as an NGINX HTTP/2 frame injection issue caused by a vulnerable proxy configuration rather than remote code execution. The main exploit logic is in cve_2026_42926_lab.php, which classifies the NGINX version, verifies that the supplied configuration contains the required vulnerable pattern, constructs a crafted HTTP/2 DATA-frame-like header plus a unique marker, sends the payload to a target URL such as /exploit, and then inspects upstream JSON logs to decide whether injected frame evidence was observed. The exploit capability is therefore protocol-level injection validation against a reverse proxy path, not post-exploitation. Repository structure: the PHP script is the primary validator/exploit driver; nginx_config_verify.sh checks whether the target config uses proxy_http_version 2, proxy_set_body with a variable, and sufficient client_max_body_size; upstream_frame_logger.py is a raw TCP/HTTP2-aware listener that parses frame headers, records payloads, flags suspicious injected frames, and writes frames_<timestamp>.json logs; run_lab_comparison.sh automates side-by-side testing of a vulnerable and patched NGINX binary using separate log directories and result files; nginx_vulnerable.conf and docker/nginx_vulnerable.docker.conf provide the intentionally vulnerable proxy pattern for local and Docker use; Dockerfile and docker-compose.yml build and orchestrate the lab environment. Primary network targets/endpoints are the exposed NGINX listener (/exploit and /version), and the upstream logger on 127.0.0.1:8081 or upstream:8081. In Docker, nginx listens on 8080 and is exposed to the host as localhost:8080. The code also references local artifact paths for logs and results. Overall, this is an operational proof-of-concept lab that actively sends a crafted payload and validates whether upstream frame injection occurs under specific NGINX versions and configurations.
Affected products & vendors
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
The version that knows your environment.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.