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The lreply function in wu-ftpd 2.6.0 and earlier versions fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input in format strings. Specifically, when processing the SITE EXEC command, the function allows remote attackers to inject format string specifiers, leading to the execution of arbitrary commands on the server.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (6 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module: 'WU-FTPD SITE EXEC/INDEX Format String Vulnerability' (modules/exploits/multi/ftp/wuftpd_site_exec_format.rb). The module exploits a format string vulnerability in Washington University FTP server (WU-FTPD) versions prior to 2.6.1. By sending specially crafted 'SITE EXEC' or 'SITE INDEX' FTP commands containing format specifiers, the exploit can corrupt memory and execute arbitrary code on the target system. The module supports automatic and manual targeting of specific vulnerable versions, with built-in logic to fingerprint the target version via FTP banner analysis. The payload is delivered as shellcode, written to a writable memory location, and executed by hijacking control flow using the format string vulnerability. The exploit requires network access to the target's FTP service (typically port 21) and valid credentials. The code is mature, weaponized, and leverages the Metasploit framework for payload handling and exploitation. No hardcoded IPs, domains, or file paths are present; the only fingerprintable endpoint is the FTP service port.
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