Multiple stack-based buffer overflows exist in the IMAP service of Mercury/32 version 4.01a. These vulnerabilities are triggered by sending excessively long arguments to various IMAP commands (including EXAMINE, SUBSCRIBE, STATUS, APPEND, CHECK, CLOSE, EXPUNGE, FETCH, RENAME, DELETE, LIST, SEARCH, CREATE, and UNSUBSCRIBE) after authenticating to the service. Exploitation allows remote authenticated attackers to crash the service or potentially execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the Mercury/32 process.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (6 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (mercury_rename.rb) that exploits a stack buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2004-1211) in the Mercury/32 v4.01a IMAP service. The exploit targets Windows 2000 SP4 and Windows XP Pro (SP0/SP1) systems running the vulnerable IMAP service. The module connects to the IMAP service over the network and sends a specially crafted RENAME command with an overly long argument, causing a buffer overflow and allowing execution of arbitrary code. The payload is fully customizable using Metasploit's payload system, supporting a variety of post-exploitation actions. The module includes a check method to verify if the target is running the vulnerable version. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the IMAP service (typically on TCP port 143) of the target host. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module.
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