RiSearch 1.0.01 and RiSearch Pro 3.2.06 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the show.pl CGI script. The script retrieves a resource specified through its url parameter without restricting the supplied URL scheme or destination. An attacker can supply HTTP or FTP URLs to cause the server to act as an open proxy, or a file URL to retrieve local files accessible to the CGI process.
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What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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Patch, then assume compromise.
No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 2 candidates as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An SSRF-style vulnerability in a CGI script that accepts and retrieves attacker-supplied URLs.
An SSRF vulnerability in a CGI script that accepts and retrieves user-supplied URLs.
A CGI script issue involving acceptance and retrieval of incoming URLs, consistent with unintended proxy behavior.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.