A stack-based buffer overflow exists in Foxit Reader 3.0 (builds 1120 and 1301) in the handling of the filename argument for the 'Open/Execute a file' action in PDF files. By supplying an overly long relative or absolute path as the filename, an attacker can trigger a buffer overflow, leading to memory corruption. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely via a maliciously crafted PDF file, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running Foxit Reader. The vulnerability was discovered by Francisco Falcón of Core Security.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module: 'Foxit Reader 3.0 Open Execute Action Stack Based Buffer Overflow'. The module exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2009-0837) in Foxit Reader 3.0 (build 1301 and earlier) on Windows XP SP2. The exploit works by generating a specially crafted PDF file ('msf.pdf') that, when opened by a vulnerable version of Foxit Reader, triggers the overflow via a malicious 'Launch' action, allowing arbitrary code execution. The module allows the attacker to embed a customizable Metasploit payload (up to 1024 bytes, with certain bad characters filtered) into the PDF. The attack vector is local, requiring the victim to open the malicious file. The repository is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module written in Ruby, and does not contain any network endpoints or external URLs beyond references in the module metadata.
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