A vulnerability in the RDS service (rds.exe) of HP Data Protector Manager 6.11 allows remote attackers to crash the service by sending a packet with a large data size to TCP port 1530. The vulnerability is due to improper handling of oversized packets, leading to a denial of service condition.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module targeting a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability in HP Data Protector's RDS service (CVE-2011-0514). The exploit is implemented in Ruby and is designed to be run within the Metasploit framework. The module sends a specially crafted TCP packet to port 1530, which is the default port for the RDS service. The malformed packet causes the _rm32.dll component of the RDS service to crash due to an excessive malloc() size, resulting in a service outage. The module is operational and does not provide shell access or code execution, but reliably crashes the target service. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the TCP port 1530 on the target host, which must be running the vulnerable HP Data Protector RDS service.
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