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system-config-firewall 1.2.29 and earlier contains an unsafe deserialization flaw in fw_dbus.py. During D-Bus communication between the GUI and the backend, the component uses Python's pickle module on data that can be influenced by a local user. Because pickle deserialization can invoke attacker-controlled object behavior during unpickling, a crafted serialized object can trigger arbitrary code execution in the context of the privileged backend, resulting in privilege escalation.
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Python pickle-related vulnerability allowing local users to execute code via pickled data.
Unsafe Python pickle deserialization in a Python script enabling local code execution via crafted pickled data.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.