An unspecified vulnerability in winmm.dll, part of the Windows Multimedia Library used by Windows Media Player in Microsoft Windows XP SP2/SP3, Server 2003 SP2, Vista SP2, and Server 2008 SP2, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a specially crafted MIDI file. The vulnerability is triggered when the crafted MIDI file is processed, leading to memory corruption and potential code execution under the context of the user running the application.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (ms12_004_midi.rb) that exploits a heap overflow vulnerability (CVE-2012-0003) in the Windows Multimedia Library (winmm.dll) when parsing specially crafted MIDI files. The exploit targets Internet Explorer 6, 7, and 8 on Windows XP SP3, leveraging the Windows Media Player ActiveX control to trigger the vulnerability. The module sets up a malicious HTTP server that serves a crafted HTML page and MIDI file to the victim. When the victim visits the attacker's page, the exploit triggers a heap overflow, corrupts memory, and executes a ROP chain to achieve remote code execution under the context of the user. The module supports different ROP chains for specific MSHTML.dll builds and allows for customizable Metasploit payloads. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the winmm.dll library. The exploit is weaponized, as it is part of the Metasploit framework and supports flexible payload delivery.
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1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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