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CVE-2012-10020 affects the FoxyPress plugin for WordPress in versions up to and including 0.4.2.1. The vulnerability is caused by missing file type validation in the plugin's uploadify.php file, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to upload arbitrary files to the server hosting the affected WordPress site. Because the upload mechanism does not properly restrict uploaded content to safe file types, an attacker may be able to place executable server-side files on the system, which can lead to remote code execution depending on server configuration and upload location.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (wp_foxypress_upload.rb) that exploits an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Foxypress WordPress plugin (versions 0.4.1.1 to 0.4.2.1). The exploit works by uploading a malicious PHP file via the vulnerable uploadify.php script and then executing it to achieve remote code execution. The module is weaponized, allowing the attacker to specify a custom PHP payload (such as a reverse shell) that will be executed on the target server. The main endpoints targeted are the uploadify.php script for file upload and the affiliate_images directory for payload execution. The exploit is network-based and requires the attacker to have access to the vulnerable WordPress instance. The repository is structured as a typical Metasploit module, written in Ruby, and leverages Metasploit's HTTP and file dropping capabilities.
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7 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.