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A vulnerability in the kernel of Samsung Galaxy S2, Galaxy Note 2, MEIZU MX, and potentially other Android devices using Exynos 4210 or 4412 processors, where the device node /dev/exynos-mem is created with world-readable and writable permissions (0666). This allows any application to read or write arbitrary physical memory, enabling privilege escalation and arbitrary code execution. The issue was exploited by the ExynosAbuse exploit.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small local privilege-escalation proof of concept for older Samsung Exynos-based Android devices affected by insecure permissions on /dev/exynos-mem. It contains two files: a README describing the technique and one C source file, r00ter.c, which implements the exploit logic. The exploit is not network-facing; it is a local attack that assumes an unprivileged user can access the vulnerable exynos-mem interface. The code relies on a separate local helper executable, ./exynos-mem, which it invokes with popen() to read and write arbitrary physical memory. The exploit scans a configured kernel physical memory range for the kallsyms format string "%pK %c %s\n" and patches it to "%p ", weakening kernel pointer restrictions so /proc/kallsyms reveals symbol addresses to a non-root user. After disclosure is enabled, the exploit parses /proc/kallsyms to locate the kernel symbol nsown_capable. It then translates that virtual symbol address into a physical address using hardcoded kernel offsets and overwrites the function body with a short ARM stub that simply returns true. This bypasses capability checks relevant to setuid(), allowing the process to call setuid(0), become root, and execute /bin/sh. Repository structure is minimal and purpose-built: README.md explains the vulnerability and exploitation steps; r00ter.c contains helper routines for memory read/write, scanning and patching the kallsyms format string, symbol extraction, kernel function patching, and the main privilege-escalation flow. The exploit is operational but device-specific, as the kernel memory boundaries and offsets are hardcoded and may need tuning per target.
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1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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