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A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in multiple Canon inkjet printers (MG3100, MG5300, MG6100, MP495, MX340, MX870, MX890, MX920, MX922) due to improper handling of crafted HTTP requests. Specifically, remote attackers on the local network can cause the device to hang by sending a specially crafted LAN_TXT24 parameter to the English/pages_MacUS/cgi_lan.cgi endpoint, followed by a direct request to English/pages_MacUS/lan_set_content.html. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation and lack of authentication on the printer's web management interface.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module written in Ruby, designed to exploit a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability (CVE-2013-4615) in the HTTP management interface of several Canon Wireless printer models. The module works by sending a specially crafted POST request to the '/English/pages_MacUS/cgi_lan.cgi' endpoint, followed by a GET request to '/English/pages_MacUS/lan_set_content.html'. If successful, the printer's management interface becomes unresponsive and can only be restored by physically power cycling the device. The exploit is operational and does not provide shell access or code execution, but rather disrupts device availability. The code is structured as a standard Metasploit module, with clear entry points and usage of the Metasploit framework's HTTP client utilities.
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