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CVE-2014-2321 is a vulnerability in the web_shell_cmd.gch component on ZTE F460 and F660 cable modems that allows remote attackers to obtain administrative access by sending crafted sendcmd requests. The exposed command interface can be abused to invoke device management functionality, including commands such as enabling the Telnet service and setting attacker-controlled credentials. The issue effectively exposes privileged administrative operations to an unauthenticated remote party through the device’s web management functionality.
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What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is an operational exploit toolkit targeting ZTE routers (exact models unspecified) via a command injection vulnerability on the /web_shell_cmd.gch endpoint over HTTPS (port 443). The main exploit is implemented in Go (zte.go), which reads a list of target IPs from stdin and sends three crafted HTTP POST requests to each target: (1) copying a file on the device, (2) downloading a binary from an attacker-controlled server, and (3) executing the downloaded binary. The payload is designed to compromise the device and likely add it to a botnet. The repository also includes setup scripts (Scanner.sh, zmap.sh) for preparing the attack environment and a password file (pass_file) for brute-force or scanning purposes. The setup.txt file provides step-by-step instructions for attackers to deploy the exploit and integrate compromised devices into a botnet. The exploit requires the attacker to modify the Go source to specify their own server and binary architecture. The attack vector is network-based, requiring access to the target's HTTPS interface. The endpoints and file paths used in the exploit are clearly fingerprintable, and the overall structure is typical of botnet propagation toolkits.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A specific CVE for which exploit code is implemented in native C inside TuxBot, but the exploit engine is dead code and never called at runtime in the analyzed version.
Vulnerability observed in exploitation telemetry (details not specified in the content).
Unknown (content lists this CVE in activity tables without describing the vulnerability).
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.