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CriticalExploited in the wildCISA KEVPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2014-8361: Realtek SDK miniigd UPnP SOAP Command Injection

Published May 1, 2015 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVSS9.8Critical · v3.1
EPSS100.0%100th percentile
CISA KEVYesAdded Sep 18, 2023
In the wildActivePer CISA KEV
Vendors
D-LinkRealtekAterm
IdentifiersCVE-2014-8361CWE-78

CVE-2014-8361 is an OS command injection vulnerability in the Realtek SDK miniigd UPnP SOAP service. Improper filtering of user-controlled data before system calls allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands through a crafted NewInternalClient request. Vulnerable implementations occur in routers and other embedded devices incorporating the SDK, including products from D-Link, NEC Aterm, ELECOM, and Buffalo. Exploitation has been documented in the wild, and multiple IoT botnets incorporate the vulnerability into their propagation routines.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation permits arbitrary command or code execution on an affected device. Root-level execution is documented for the Realtek rtl81xx SDK implementation, enabling privileged device compromise. The vulnerability is used by IoT malware for infection and self-propagation, including botnets with DDoS and backdoor capabilities. Exact execution privileges and affected firmware boundaries depend on the device implementation.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Disable the vulnerable miniigd UPnP SOAP service where feasible. Otherwise, restrict service access to trusted networks, block external-network access using firewall controls, and remove unnecessary Internet exposure. Segment affected IoT devices from critical systems to limit propagation and access following compromise. These controls reduce exposure but do not correct the underlying command injection flaw.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Apply vendor-supported firmware or software updates addressing CVE-2014-8361 for the exact device model and hardware revision. No single fixed SDK or firmware version applies across all affected products. Follow vendor mitigation instructions where updates are unavailable; discontinue or replace affected products if effective mitigations are unavailable.

Public exploits

Exploits

3 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis.

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dlink_upnp_exec_noauth.rbThis repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/dlink_upnp_exec_noauth.rb) targeting D-Link routers (specifically DIR-865 and DIR-645) vulnerable to unauthenticated OS command injection via the UPnP SOAP interface (CVE-2014-8361). The exploit works by sending a crafted SOAP AddPortMapping request to the /soap.cgi endpoint, injecting arbitrary shell commands into the NewInternalClient field. The module uses Metasploit's command stager to deliver payloads, supporting both MIPS Little Endian and Big Endian architectures. The exploit is blind (no command output is returned) and requires the target's UPnP SOAP web interface to be accessible (default port 49152). The module includes a check method to verify if the target is a D-Link device by requesting /InternetGatewayDevice.xml and looking for a model number. The code is operational and ready for use within the Metasploit framework.Disclosed Jul 5, 2013 · Framework: metasploit · ruby · networkWeaponizedrealtek_miniigd_upnp_exec_noauth.rbThis repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/realtek_miniigd_upnp_exec_noauth.rb) targeting a command injection vulnerability (CVE-2014-8361) in the Realtek SDK miniigd UPnP SOAP interface. The exploit is unauthenticated and works by sending a crafted SOAP request to the /wanipcn.xml endpoint, injecting arbitrary OS commands via the NewInternalClient field. The module supports both MIPS Little Endian and Big Endian architectures, and uses Metasploit's command stager to deploy payloads. The exploit checks for the presence of the vulnerable service by requesting /picsdesc.xml and looking for a specific server header. The main attack vector is network-based, requiring access to the device's UPnP SOAP web interface (default port 52869). The exploit is operational and can be used to gain remote code execution on affected devices, such as the Trendnet TEW-731BR router. No authentication is required, making this a high-impact vulnerability for exposed devices.Disclosed Apr 24, 2015 · Framework: metasploit · ruby · networkWeaponizedCVE-2014-8361This seven-file standalone repository contains a Python exploit client, an intentionally vulnerable Python HTTP emulator, Docker deployment configuration, documentation, an MIT license, and Git exclusions. No exploit framework is used. Repository URL, revision, and archive size were not supplied. poc/poc.py constructs a WANIPConnection:1 AddPortMapping SOAP request with shell metacharacters in NewInternalClient. Its basic payload creates a marker file, then the client queries the mock's status endpoint. Host, port, control path, and marker are configurable. It uses Python's standard library and performs no SSDP discovery, UDP traffic, authentication, downloading, or callback communication. mock/mock_miniigd.py extracts NewInternalClient with a regular expression and inserts it directly into an iptables command executed with shell=True and a five-second timeout. This deliberately permits command execution even if iptables is unavailable. The POST handler does not enforce the control path or validate SOAPAction. It also exposes a minimal device-description response and a status endpoint listing miniigd-prefixed files. The repository labels this behavior as a model of CVE-2014-8361; it does not contain actual vulnerable firmware or establish exploitation against a specific device/version. Real-device verification is limited because /__lab_status is laboratory-specific. Custom markers without the miniigd- prefix will not appear in the mock's status listing. Existing marker files can produce false-positive success reports, and HTTP 200 alone does not prove execution. Docker runs the service as a non-root user, drops all capabilities, enables no-new-privileges, mounts /tmp as tmpfs, and publishes the service only on host loopback. Despite a source comment claiming no Internet access, the supplied Compose configuration does not explicitly disable outbound networking. The client's address restriction is a string-prefix check, not robust IP-range validation. The code is a functional marker-based laboratory exploit rather than a detection-only script or a weaponized payload.krevetkqqq · Disclosed Oct 30, 2026 · python · network · webOperational
Exposure surface

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
AtermW1200ex Firmwareoperating_system
AtermW1200ex-Ms Firmwareoperating_system
AtermW300p Firmwareoperating_system
AtermW500p Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWf300hp2 Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWf800hp Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWg1200hp Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWg1200hp2 Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWg1200hp3 Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWg1200hs Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWg1200hs2 Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWg1800hp3 Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWg1800hp4 Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWg1900hp Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWg1900hp2 Firmwareoperating_system
AtermWr8165n Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDir-501 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDir-515 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDir-600l Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDir-605l Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDir-615 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDir-619l Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDir-809 Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDir-900l Firmwareoperating_system
D-LinkDir-905l Firmwareoperating_system
RealtekRealtek Sdkapplication
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2014-8361 exploited in the wild?
Yes. As of Oct 16, 2026, Mallory has reports of exploitation in the wild, and CISA added it to KEV on Sep 18, 2023.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2014-8361?
Yes. Mallory tracks 3 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2014-8361, the earliest disclosed Jul 5, 2013.
Is there a patch for CVE-2014-8361?
Apply vendor-supported firmware or software updates addressing CVE-2014-8361 for the exact device model and hardware revision. No single fixed SDK or firmware version applies across all affected products.
What products are affected by CVE-2014-8361?
Realtek Sdk, D-Link Dir-501 Firmware, D-Link Dir-515 Firmware, D-Link Dir-600l Firmware, D-Link Dir-605l Firmware, and at least 21 more.
How severe is CVE-2014-8361?
CVE-2014-8361 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8 (Critical) and an EPSS score of 100.0% (100th percentile) as of Oct 16, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

50 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, and which detections to deploy tonight.
Exposure mappingQuery your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Threat actor evidence4Every report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malware76Malware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signatures4YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity1Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.