DROWN
DROWN (Decrypting RSA with Obsolete and Weakened eNcryption) is a cross-protocol cryptographic attack that uses SSLv2 handshakes to decrypt TLS sessions. SSLv2 sends a ServerVerify message before establishing that the client possesses the required RSA plaintext, exposing a Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle. An attacker can combine this oracle with weaknesses in EXPORT-grade encryption to recover TLS session secrets. Affected implementations include OpenSSL before 1.0.1s and the 1.0.2 branch before 1.0.2g, when configured to support vulnerable SSLv2 operation, as well as other SSLv2 implementations. A TLS service can be exposed even when it disables SSLv2 if another reachable service supports SSLv2 using the same RSA private key.
What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
Successful exploitation compromises the confidentiality of intercepted TLS sessions using RSA key exchange, potentially exposing credentials and application data. Previously recorded non-forward-secure sessions can also be decrypted while a suitable SSLv2 oracle remains available. Passively recorded forward-secure sessions are not directly vulnerable. Separate legacy OpenSSL flaws can accelerate DROWN and enable stronger active man-in-the-middle attacks. DROWN does not directly recover the server's RSA private key or provide arbitrary code execution.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Disable SSLv2 entirely on every SSL/TLS endpoint, including mail services and other services sharing RSA keys with HTTPS endpoints. Do not rely solely on disabling EXPORT or other SSLv2 cipher suites: CVE-2015-3197 can permit negotiation of nominally disabled SSLv2 ciphers on unpatched OpenSSL servers. Restrict network access to affected services while updates are pending. Prefer TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 with forward-secure key exchange.
Patch, then assume compromise.
Upgrade affected OpenSSL installations to a currently supported release incorporating the DROWN countermeasures. The original fixed releases were OpenSSL 1.0.1s and 1.0.2g, which disabled SSLv2 by default at build time and removed vulnerable SSLv2 EXPORT and 56-bit DES ciphers. For embedded or vendor-managed products, install the applicable vendor firmware or security update. Inventory every service sharing an RSA private key and ensure SSLv2 is disabled across all of them. Restart affected services after replacing their cryptographic libraries. Private-key regeneration is not required solely because of DROWN once all vulnerable services sharing the key have been addressed.
No validated public exploits yet. Hidden: 2 rejected by Mallory's analysis as not a working exploit.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.