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Sweet32 is a cryptographic weakness in DES and Triple DES when used in protocols such as TLS, SSH, and IPsec. The issue arises from the 64-bit block size of these ciphers, which reaches the birthday bound after approximately 2^32 blocks under the same key. In long-lived encrypted sessions, an active network attacker can induce enough traffic to cause block collisions and then use those collisions in a birthday attack to recover portions of cleartext. Practical demonstrations focused on HTTPS sessions using Triple DES in CBC mode, where attacker-controlled JavaScript running in a victim browser was used to generate large volumes of requests over a single TLS connection and recover sensitive data such as session cookie material. The vulnerability is not a software memory-safety flaw in a specific function; it is an inherent weakness of legacy 64-bit block ciphers in prolonged sessions.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept (POC) demonstration of the Sweet32 attack (CVE-2016-2183), which targets cryptographic protocols using 64-bit block ciphers (notably 3DES) in CBC mode. The attack exploits the birthday paradox to recover secret plaintext (such as session cookies) from encrypted traffic by identifying collisions in ciphertext blocks. The repository contains several Python scripts: - `generate_packets.py`: Generates a large number of encrypted HTTP request/response packets with a user-specified cookie, simulating real-world encrypted traffic. - `generate_rigged_packets.py`: Crafts a special packet with a guaranteed block collision, allowing the attack to be demonstrated quickly and reliably. - `sweet32.py`: Implements the Sweet32 attack logic, scanning the encrypted packet file for block collisions and recovering the secret cookie value using the attack formula. - `lib/packetfile.py` and `lib/tridescbc.py`: Provide utility functions for packet file I/O and 3DES CBC encryption/decryption. The exploit does not target a specific product but rather demonstrates the general vulnerability of 64-bit block ciphers in CBC mode to birthday attacks. The scripts are self-contained and require only Python 3 and the pycryptodome library. The attack vector is network-based, simulating the interception and analysis of encrypted HTTP traffic. The endpoints used are simulated (localhost:5000) and file-based packet dumps for demonstration purposes. No real-world network exploitation is performed; the repository is intended for educational and research use.
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A known weakness in 3DES/SWEET32 referenced in the article as one of the long-known cipher issues affecting weak VPN tunnel configurations.
A low-severity OpenSSL issue addressed as a SWEET32 mitigation affecting OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.0.1.
A cryptographic weakness in the 64-bit block size used by 3DES/triple-DES that enables birthday-bound collisions in long TLS sessions, potentially allowing recovery of sensitive information such as session cookies.
A vulnerability related to 64-bit block ciphers in TLS, referenced in test output showing the evaluated setup is not vulnerable.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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