CVE-2019-5825 is a high-severity out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the V8 JavaScript engine used by Google Chrome prior to version 73.0.3683.86. A remote attacker could trigger an out-of-bounds write through a crafted HTML page, resulting in heap corruption.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/multi/browser/chrome_array_map.rb) that exploits CVE-2019-5825, a vulnerability in Google Chrome versions 72 and 73 (notably 73.0.3683.86, 64-bit) on Windows and macOS. The exploit leverages a bug in the Array.map implementation to corrupt the length of a float array, enabling arbitrary read/write (AARW) in memory. It then uses WebAssembly to allocate a RWX (read-write-execute) memory region, into which the attacker's shellcode (Metasploit payload) is written and executed. The exploit is delivered via a malicious HTTP server that serves a crafted HTML/JavaScript payload to the victim's browser. Successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution within the Chrome renderer process, but requires the browser to be run with the --no-sandbox flag. The module is operational and provides a working exploit with a customizable payload, but is not weaponized for mass exploitation. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the root path (/) of the HTTP server started by the module, which serves the exploit page.
This repository contains a working exploit for CVE-2019-5825, a vulnerability in Google Chrome's V8 JavaScript engine (version 6.9.0, as shipped with Chrome 73.0.3683.86). The exploit targets the browser in --no-sandbox mode and achieves arbitrary read/write (AARW) in the V8 heap by corrupting array lengths and object pointers via a crafted Array.map call. The main exploit logic is implemented in 'exodus.js', which demonstrates the full chain from bug trigger to shellcode execution by abusing a WebAssembly instance to obtain a RWX memory page. The shellcode is injected and executed, resulting in remote code execution. Supporting files include 'exploit.js' and 'nextline.js', which are alternative or simplified exploit scripts for the same vulnerability, and 'exploit.sh', a Bash script to automate testing on both ia32 and x64 V8 d8 shells. The repository is operational and provides a full exploit chain, including payload delivery. No network endpoints or external services are targeted; the exploit is local to the browser or JavaScript engine process. The code is well-structured, with clear separation between helper functions, exploit primitives, and payload delivery.
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3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Google Chrome vulnerability used by POISON CARP in MOONSHINE; exploit code was publicly released before the patch had reached Chrome users.
A Google Chrome vulnerability for which Exodus Intelligence published working exploit code; used by MOONSHINE against vulnerable Android Chrome versions.
A high-severity out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the V8 JavaScript engine. It was fixed in a previous Chrome release but omitted from that release's notes.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.