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A vulnerability in the getProcessRecordLocked function of ActivityManagerService.java in Android allows isolated apps to be handled incorrectly. This flaw enables a local attacker to escalate privileges without requiring additional execution privileges or user interaction. The vulnerability affects Android versions 8.0, 8.1, 9, and 10.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept (POC) exploit for CVE-2020-0001, targeting Android devices. The core of the exploit is an Android application that demonstrates the ability to run a system component (the Settings app) in an untrusted app process by registering a foreground service in an isolated process with the process name 'com.android.settings'. The repository is structured as a standard Android Studio project, with Java source code for the MainActivity and IsolatedService, relevant AndroidManifest and resource files, and build scripts. The MainActivity provides a button to start the IsolatedService, which is configured in the manifest to run in an isolated process with the system component's process name. The included script.js is a Frida script for dynamic analysis and debugging of Android's ActivityManagerService and related internals, likely used to observe or further analyze the exploit's effects. The exploit does not provide a weaponized payload but serves as a clear demonstration of the vulnerability, requiring the user to run the app and interact with the Settings component. No network endpoints are present; the attack vector is local, requiring code execution on the target device.
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