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CVE-2020-12702 describes a vulnerability in the Quick Pairing mode of the eWeLink mobile application (Android V4.9.2 and earlier, iOS V4.9.1 and earlier), where weak encryption is used during the device pairing process. This allows an attacker in physical proximity to intercept and eavesdrop on Wi-Fi credentials and other sensitive data transmitted over the air during pairing.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains an operational exploit for CVE-2020-12702, targeting the eWeLink mobile application's Quick Pairing mode. The main script, 'eWeLinkESPT.py', is a Python tool that leverages pyshark and tshark to capture Wi-Fi packets in monitor mode. It decodes and decrypts Wi-Fi credentials (SSID and password) transmitted by the eWeLink app to ESP-based IoT devices (such as ITEAD SONOFF) during the pairing process. The exploit works by monitoring multicast packets and reconstructing the credential data from the ESP Touch protocol, which is weakly encrypted. The repository includes a helper module ('tools.py') with functions for packet parsing and validation. The exploit requires physical proximity to the target network and a compatible Wi-Fi interface. No hardcoded network endpoints or IP addresses are present; the attack is performed by passively sniffing Wi-Fi traffic during device onboarding. The code is mature and functional, providing direct access to sensitive Wi-Fi credentials if the attack is successful.
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