CVE-2020-17144 is a Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability disclosed in December 2020. Available context identifies it as a post-authentication deserialization flaw affecting Exchange Server 2010 and exploitable through Outlook Web Access. The vulnerability is described as requiring a valid authenticated session and belonging to the same general class as other Exchange deserialization issues, allowing crafted serialized input to be processed unsafely by the server. Successful exploitation enables code execution in the context of the Exchange application on the targeted server.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a C# exploit for CVE-2020-17144, targeting Microsoft Exchange Server 2010. The exploit leverages a deserialization vulnerability in Exchange Web Services (EWS) to write a webshell to the server's autodiscover directory, specifically at 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V14\ClientAccess\autodiscover\Services.aspx'. The main entry point is 'Program.cs', which takes three arguments: the target Exchange server's domain, a username, and a password. The exploit uses the ysoserial.net gadget chain to generate a malicious serialized payload, which is then uploaded to the server via the EWS API. The default payload writes a simple webshell, but the code can be modified to execute arbitrary commands. The repository includes all necessary code to generate the payload and interact with the Exchange server, and references the Exchange Web Services Managed API. The README provides usage instructions and notes that the exploit requires valid user credentials and an Exchange 2010 environment.
This repository contains a weaponized exploit for CVE-2020-17144, a deserialization vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange 2010's MRM.AutoTag.Model. The main exploit file (CVE-2020-17144.cs) authenticates to the Exchange Web Services endpoint using provided credentials and uploads a malicious configuration containing a serialized payload (compiled from e.cs as e.dll). The payload, when deserialized by Exchange, starts an HTTP listener on port 80 at /ews/soap/. This backdoor allows an attacker to execute arbitrary system commands by sending HTTP requests with a specific query parameter (e.g., http://[target]/ews/soap/?pass=whoami). The repository includes a batch file (make.bat) for building the exploit and payload DLL. The exploit requires valid Exchange credentials and targets Exchange 2010 servers vulnerable to CVE-2020-17144. The structure is straightforward: CVE-2020-17144.cs (exploit logic), e.cs (payload/backdoor), make.bat (build script), and README.md (usage instructions).
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11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A vulnerability listed as one of several publicly available exploits leveraged by Forest Blizzard.
A referenced authenticated deserialization vulnerability affecting Exchange 2010 servers, mentioned only as background comparison for gadget-chain and exploitation discussion.
A Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerability used by the threat actor to help establish persistence and escalate privileges during the intrusion.
Specific vulnerability listed in the content with severity Important.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.