CVE-2020-3433 is a DLL hijacking vulnerability in the interprocess communication channel of Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Windows. Insufficient validation of resources loaded at runtime allows an authenticated local attacker to send a crafted IPC message to the AnyConnect process and cause arbitrary code execution with SYSTEM privileges.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (anyconnect_lpe.rb) that exploits two local privilege escalation vulnerabilities (CVE-2020-3153 and CVE-2020-3433) in Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Windows. The exploit targets the installer component, which is vulnerable to path traversal and DLL hijacking, allowing a local attacker to gain SYSTEM privileges. The module communicates with the Cisco AnyConnect agent via a local TCP IPC endpoint (127.0.0.1:62522), crafts a malicious command, and drops a payload DLL (dbghelp.dll) to a writable location. The vulnerable service then loads the attacker's DLL as SYSTEM, resulting in arbitrary code execution. The module is weaponized, supporting customizable Metasploit payloads (default: meterpreter/reverse_tcp), and is suitable for post-exploitation scenarios where the attacker already has local access. The code is well-structured, leverages Metasploit's file dropping and privilege escalation utilities, and provides cleanup routines for artifacts left on disk.
This repository contains operational proof-of-concept exploits for three vulnerabilities in Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Windows: CVE-2020-3433 (local privilege escalation via DLL hijacking), CVE-2020-3434 (denial of service via crafted IPC messages), and CVE-2020-3435 (VPN profile modification/Always-On bypass). The structure includes three Visual Studio C# projects, each targeting one of the vulnerabilities, with main logic in their respective Program.cs files. The exploits interact with the AnyConnect IPC protocol over TCP port 62522 on localhost, sending crafted commands to the vpnagent.exe service. Key fingerprintable endpoints include the default installation path for vpndownloader.exe and the VPN profile storage directory. The exploits require local access and valid credentials, and provide SYSTEM-level code execution, service disruption, or profile manipulation depending on the vulnerability targeted. The repository also includes detailed markdown documentation describing the vulnerabilities, exploitation steps, and technical background.
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