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CVE-2020-9934 is a vulnerability in macOS's Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) framework, arising from improper handling of environment variables. A local attacker can exploit this flaw to grant arbitrary TCC entitlements to themselves or other processes by extracting entitlements from the tccd process. This enables unauthorized access to TCC-protected directories, allowing the attacker to create, read, list, and delete files that are normally protected by macOS privacy controls.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit post-exploitation module (modules/post/osx/escalate/tccbypass.rb) targeting macOS Catalina (versions 10.15.0 through 10.15.5) and exploiting CVE-2020-9934. The module leverages a vulnerability in the TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) daemon, allowing an attacker with local access to manipulate the TCC database by setting the HOME environment variable to a writable directory. The exploit creates a fake TCC database, restarts the TCC daemon to use this database, and inserts entitlements for various protected services (such as camera, microphone, screen capture, and file access) for the Terminal application. The module is operational and provides attackers with elevated access to sensitive macOS services. The code is written in Ruby and is designed to be run within the Metasploit framework. No network endpoints are involved; the attack vector is local privilege escalation via file and environment variable manipulation.
This repository is a Proof of Concept exploit for CVE-2020-9934, targeting macOS's TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) framework. The exploit is implemented in Swift and consists of two main code files: BypassTCC.swift, which contains the core logic for bypassing TCC protections, and main.swift, which demonstrates the exploit's capabilities. The exploit works by creating a fake TCC database in a temporary directory, granting all TCC entitlements to itself and Terminal.app, and then restarting the TCC daemon to apply these changes. The PoC then demonstrates its success by creating, reading, listing, and deleting a file in a TCC-protected directory, actions that would normally be restricted. The attack vector is local, requiring code execution on the target system. Several fingerprintable file paths are used, including the fake TCC database and the demo file. The exploit is a functional PoC and does not include weaponized or easily customizable payloads.
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