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CVE-2022-31199 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the User Activity Video Recording component of Netwrix Auditor. The flaw affects Netwrix Auditor versions prior to 10.5 and is caused by insecure deserialization in an unsecured .NET remoting service used by the UAVR component. A remote attacker can send crafted serialized .NET objects to the exposed remoting endpoint and trigger arbitrary code execution on the Netwrix Auditor server or affected agent systems. Available reporting indicates the vulnerable service is reachable over TCP port 9004 and that successful exploitation can execute within the context of the affected service, which has been observed running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a comprehensive lab and exploit toolkit for CVE-2022-31199, a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Netwrix Auditor (<10.5) via insecure .NET Remoting deserialization. The structure includes: - A vulnerable server simulator (Python and C#/.NET versions) that mimics the Netwrix UAVRServer endpoint on TCP port 9004, with intentionally insecure deserialization settings (TypeFilterLevel=Full). - Exploit scripts in Python (exploit.py, test_exploit.py) and PowerShell (exploit.ps1) that can check for the vulnerability and deliver serialized payloads to achieve RCE. The Python scripts can use payloads generated by ysoserial.net, and the PowerShell script automates the full attack chain. - Dockerfiles and docker-compose files for easy lab deployment on Windows, Linux, and macOS, including both the vulnerable server and an attacker machine. - Detection rules (Snort, YARA) and a Nuclei template for automated detection and scanning. - Documentation and guides for both manual and automated exploitation, including example payloads and post-exploitation steps. The main attack vector is network-based, targeting the .NET Remoting service on TCP port 9004. The exploit achieves SYSTEM-level code execution by sending a malicious serialized object to the UAVRServer endpoint. The repository is well-structured for both educational and practical exploitation, with clear separation between vulnerable server code, exploit tools, detection signatures, and documentation.
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7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A critical insecure object deserialization vulnerability in Netwrix Auditor that exposes an unsecured .NET remoting service on TCP port 9004, allowing remote code execution with the privileges of the affected service.
A critical remote code execution vulnerability in Netwrix Auditor's User Activity Video Recording (UAVR) component, caused by insecure object deserialization in the .NET remoting protocol. Allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code as SYSTEM, potentially compromising Active Directory environments.
A vulnerability in Netwrix Auditor used for initial access; linked to Truebot activity and later Clop ransomware operations.
A remote code execution vulnerability in Netwrix Auditor caused by insecure object deserialization via an unsecured .NET remoting service. The article says attackers used it as an entry vector to deploy Truebot and notes exploitation could enable broad Active Directory compromise.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.