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CVE-2022-45460 is a stack-based buffer overflow in the HTTP request handling of multiple Xiongmai NVR devices, including MBD6304T V4.02.R11.00000117.10001.131900.00000 and NBD6808T-PL V4.02.R11.C7431119.12001.130000.00000. The flaw is reachable remotely without authentication via the embedded web server. According to the provided content, a crafted HTTP request containing an overly long request URI is passed to a sprintf call during URI parsing, causing a stack overflow. Successful exploitation can crash the web server and trigger a device reboot; the content also states that arbitrary code execution is possible for an unauthenticated remote attacker. The issue is described as distinct from CVE-2018-10088, though it may overlap with CVE-2017-16725.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains three Python proof-of-concept exploits (exploit-pwntools.py, exploit-simple.py, exploit.py) targeting CVE-2022-45460, a stack-based buffer overflow in the URI parsing of the XiongMai uc-httpd web server (commonly used in IoT devices). All exploits operate by first leaking the target's memory map via a directory traversal in an HTTP GET request to /../../../../../proc/self/maps, which allows the attacker to determine the base address of loaded libraries. Using this information, the exploit crafts a malicious HTTP GET request with a specially constructed URI that overflows the stack and executes a ROP chain. The ROP chain ultimately calls system('/bin/sh') or starts a telnet daemon, granting the attacker remote code execution on the device. The exploits require the attacker to specify the target's IP address and port. The code is operational and demonstrates a full exploit chain, including memory leak, ROP chain construction, and interactive shell access. The repository is well-structured, with each exploit script providing a slightly different approach (one using pwntools, one using only the standard library, and one with an interactive shell).
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A known vulnerability affecting Xiongmai NVR/IP camera HTTP servers, discussed as a plausible 7777-Botnet infection vector based on co-location and public exploit availability.
A Xiongmai URI buffer overflow vulnerability with public exploits, assessed as a plausible infection vector for 7777-Botnet on Xiongmai devices.
An unauthenticated stack-based buffer overflow in HTTP request-URI parsing on Xiongmai devices (distinct from CVE-2018-10088), associated with tothi’s published exploit and often discussed as a practical RCE path when combined with file disclosure for address discovery.
An unauthenticated stack-based buffer overflow in HTTP request-URI parsing on Xiongmai devices (distinct from CVE-2018-10088), associated with tothi’s published exploit and often discussed as a practical RCE path when combined with file disclosure for address discovery.
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