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CriticalCISA KEVExploited in the wildPublic exploit

SQL Injection in Progress MOVEit Transfer

IdentifiersCVE-2023-34362CWE-89· Improper Neutralization of Special…

CVE-2023-34362 is a critical SQL injection vulnerability in the Progress MOVEit Transfer web application. Affected versions are all releases before 2021.0.6 (13.0.6), 2021.1.4 (13.1.4), 2022.0.4 (14.0.4), 2022.1.5 (14.1.5), and 2023.0.1 (15.0.1), with older unsupported versions also affected. The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to send crafted HTTP or HTTPS requests to vulnerable web application endpoints, including reporting around /human.aspx, where insufficient sanitization of user-controlled input leads to attacker-controlled SQL execution against the MOVEit backend database. Depending on the database backend in use—MySQL, Microsoft SQL Server, or Azure SQL—attackers can enumerate schema information, extract database contents, and execute SQL statements that modify or delete data. Reporting in the provided content also states that attackers used the vulnerability as part of a broader exploitation chain to obtain privileged tokens, create or abuse accounts, deploy the LEMURLOOT web shell (often as human2.aspx), and in some cases achieve remote code execution and large-scale data theft.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation can give an unauthenticated remote attacker direct access to the MOVEit Transfer database and the ability to read, alter, or delete database contents. In observed real-world exploitation, attackers used this access to steal sensitive files and database data, extract credentials and Azure storage secrets, create persistence through web shells and attacker-controlled accounts, and support extortion operations. The practical impact is high across confidentiality, integrity, and availability: exposure of transferred files and stored data, unauthorized modification of application state and users, destruction or corruption of database elements, and follow-on compromise of the MOVEit application environment. The vulnerability was actively exploited in the wild in May and June 2023 at large scale.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If immediate patching is not possible, temporarily disable external web access to MOVEit Transfer by blocking HTTP/HTTPS access, specifically ports 80 and 443, as described in the provided content; SFTP and FTP may remain operational. Reduce exposure by removing public internet access, placing the service behind restrictive network controls such as firewall/VPN/SSO, and closely monitoring for suspicious requests, anomalous SQL errors, unexpected outbound transfers, and new files in the web root. Treat any unpatched internet-exposed instance as high risk and perform forensic review before returning it to service.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade MOVEit Transfer to a fixed release. The provided content identifies patched versions as 2021.0.6 (13.0.6), 2021.1.4 (13.1.4), 2022.0.4 (14.0.4), 2022.1.5 (14.1.5), and 2023.0.1 (15.0.1). Additional content also references later cumulative fixed builds for corresponding branches and a special patch for 2020.1.x; unsupported older versions should be upgraded to a supported fixed version. Because this vulnerability was exploited in the wild, remediation should include incident response actions in addition to patching: review for web shells such as human2.aspx or _human2.aspx, inspect wwwroot and logs for suspicious files and requests, review database logs for anomalous SQL activity, identify and remove attacker-created accounts or tokens, and rotate exposed credentials, database credentials, and Azure/cloud storage keys where applicable.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

3 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (7 hidden).

VALID 3 / 10 TOTALView more in app
abyss-c2MaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository is a multi-module Python offensive framework centered on exploiting HiSilicon DVR/NVR/IP camera devices via CVE-2020-25078, then managing compromised hosts through a Flask/SocketIO web panel. It is not a simple single-file PoC: it includes a control server (server.py), persistence and post-exploitation tooling, credential attacks, recon modules, web vulnerability scanners, network service checks, pivoting, reverse shell support, and a SQLite-backed datastore. Core exploit logic is in exploit.py and scanner.py. exploit.py probes numerous traversal/disclosure paths such as /../../.../mnt/mtd/Config/Account1 and related config/system files, parses returned content with multiple regex patterns to recover credentials, fingerprints device families, and falls back to known default credentials when disclosure succeeds but parsing does not. scanner.py operationalizes this by scanning IPs/CIDRs and common ports, checking liveness, fingerprinting likely cameras, invoking the CVE-2020-25078 checks, and storing recovered credentials in cameras.db. Post-exploitation capability is substantial. telnet_client.py provides raw Telnet login and command execution. botnet.py fans out commands across stored hosts. persistence.py installs SSH authorized_keys, cron, rc.local, init.d, systemd, inittab telnetd, and bind-shell style persistence. reverse_shell.py generates many Linux/IoT reverse shell one-liners and runs listeners. pivot_chain.py and socks_pivot.py support chained execution and local SOCKS5 pivoting through compromised hosts. Additional modules broaden scope beyond the HiSilicon exploit: brute.py and cred_spray.py perform credential attacks across Telnet, SSH, FTP, HTTP, SMB, databases, VNC, LDAP, WinRM, and more; network_exploit.py checks for exposed/misconfigured services and some well-known vulnerabilities such as MS17-010 and BlueKeep; web_exploit.py, web_cves.py, web_bugs.py, and web_brute.py scan websites for exposed files, CMS fingerprints, generic bug classes, and multiple CVE signatures. Recon/intel support includes ASN, DNS, GeoIP, JARM, WAF detection, proxy/Tor rotation, screenshot grabbing from camera snapshot endpoints, and Telegram/Discord/AbuseIPDB integrations. The repository structure is coherent and functional, with many CLI-capable modules and a central web UI in templates/index.html. Overall, this is an operational exploit-and-post-exploitation toolkit focused on HiSilicon IoT devices but expanded into a broader C2-style offensive platform.

flags-altDisclosed May 20, 2026pythonhtmlnetworkweblocal
CVE-2023-34362MaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository provides a working proof-of-concept (POC) exploit for CVE-2023-34362, a critical SQL injection and remote code execution vulnerability in Progress MOVEit Transfer. The main exploit script (CVE-2023-34362.py) is a Python tool that automates the attack chain: 1. It first abuses a SQL injection in the guest access functionality to set arbitrary session variables and ultimately obtain a sysadmin API access token. 2. The exploit then uses this token to perform a deserialization attack during a file upload, resulting in remote code execution (RCE) on the MOVEit Transfer server. 3. The default payload writes a file to C:\Windows\Temp\message.txt, but the exploit can be customized to execute arbitrary commands using ysoserial.net-generated payloads. The repository includes supporting files: a certificate and private key (cert.crt, key.pem, key.pub) for forging JWTs required in the attack, and a provider_file.txt with example IDP metadata. The README.md provides technical background, usage instructions, and mitigation advice. The exploit targets unpatched MOVEit Transfer servers accessible over the network and requires interaction with specific web endpoints (/guestaccess.aspx and /moveitisapi/moveitisapi.dll). The attack vector is network-based, and the exploit is operational, providing a full attack chain from initial access to RCE.

horizon3aiDisclosed Jun 9, 2023pythonnetwork
CVE-2023-34362MaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository contains a Ruby exploit script (CVE-2023-34362.rb) targeting the MOVEit Transfer application, exploiting CVE-2023-34362. The exploit achieves unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) by chaining a SQL injection vulnerability with unsafe deserialization. The script performs the following steps: establishes a session, leverages SQL injection to plant a serialized .NET gadget (configured to spawn 'notepad.exe') in the database, and then triggers deserialization via a crafted API call, resulting in code execution on the server. The exploit also includes cleanup steps to remove indicators of compromise from the database. The main endpoints targeted are '/moveitisapi/moveitisapi.dll', '/guestaccess.aspx', and '/api/v1/folders/<folder_id>/files'. The repository consists of the exploit script and a detailed README explaining usage and exploitation flow. The exploit is operational, with a hardcoded payload, and is not part of a larger framework.

sfewer-r7Disclosed Jun 12, 2023rubynetwork
EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
Progress SoftwareMoveit Cloudapplication
Progress SoftwareMoveit Transferapplication

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, which detections to deploy, and what to do tonight.
Exposure mapping

Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.

Threat actor evidence42

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware33

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures2

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity8

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.