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HAProxy versions before 2.8.2 accepted a number-sign character as part of the URI path component rather than correctly handling it as a URI fragment delimiter. This can cause a path_end routing rule to evaluate the URI differently from a backend static-content server. An attacker can use a crafted URI fragment to satisfy an HAProxy suffix-based routing condition while the backend interprets the request as a different resource, potentially exposing content that should not be reachable through that route.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) for CVE-2023-45539, a vulnerability in HAProxy versions prior to 2.8.2. The exploit demonstrates how HAProxy's handling of the '#' character in URIs can be abused to bypass access controls when 'path_end' ACLs are used for routing. The repository contains three files: a README.md explaining the vulnerability and providing example requests, a docker-compose.yaml that sets up a vulnerable HAProxy instance (version 2.8.1) with the provided configuration, and haproxy.cfg which defines the routing logic. The PoC shows that by appending a fragment (e.g., #.png) to a restricted path (such as /admin), the request is misrouted to a static backend, allowing unauthorized access. The exploit is network-based and targets HAProxy instances with specific routing configurations. No weaponized payload is included; the repository is focused on demonstrating the misrouting logic and access control bypass.
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