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HighExploited in the wildCISA KEVPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2023-46805: Authentication Bypass in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure

Published Jan 12, 2024 · Updated 2 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
CVSS8.2High · v3.1
EPSS100.0%100th percentile
CISA KEVYesAdded Jan 10, 2024
In the wildActivePer CISA KEV
Vendor
Ivanti
IdentifiersCVE-2023-46805CWE-287 · Improper Authentication

CVE-2023-46805 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the web components of Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure, affecting releases in the 9.x and 22.x families. Directory traversal in requests to an authentication-exempt API endpoint bypasses frontend access-control checks, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to reach restricted backend resources. Attackers can chain the bypass with the command injection vulnerability CVE-2024-21887 to execute arbitrary system commands without authentication. Exploitation of the pair has been observed since at least early December 2023.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation permits unauthorized access to restricted appliance resources and potentially sensitive system information. When chained with CVE-2024-21887, it enables unauthenticated remote command execution. Observed exploitation of the chain has included configuration and credential theft, web shell installation, deployment of KrustyLoader and Sliver, Mirai infections, cryptomining, and lateral movement. These downstream outcomes depend on the command injection vulnerability and subsequent attacker activity, rather than authentication bypass alone.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If patching must be delayed, apply Ivanti's applicable interim mitigation and restrict network access to affected gateways; disconnect appliances when their security cannot be assured. The original mitigation could be bypassed through a separate CVE-2024-21893 exploit chain, so it is not a substitute for comprehensive patching. Review integrity-check results, unexpected services, and outbound traffic, and investigate connected Active Directory environments. A clean integrity check or factory reset is not conclusive evidence of eradication: attackers have evaded integrity checks, and research identified possible persistence through factory resets.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Apply Ivanti's current security updates for the affected Connect Secure or Policy Secure release. Published fixed Connect Secure releases include 9.1R14.4, 9.1R17.2, 9.1R18.3, 22.4R2.2, and 22.5R1.1; use the latest supported patched release rather than treating these historical fixes as a current security baseline. Investigate potentially compromised appliances and connected systems, reset exposed credentials, and follow current vendor recovery guidance. Patching alone does not remove an existing compromise.

Public exploits

Exploits

3 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis. Hidden: 5 rejected by Mallory's analysis as not a working exploit.

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ivanti_connect_secure_rce_cve_2023_46805.rbThis repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure appliances vulnerable to a chain of authentication bypass (CVE-2023-46805) and command injection (CVE-2024-21887) vulnerabilities. The exploit is weaponized, allowing unauthenticated remote code execution as root on affected systems running versions 9.x and 22.x prior to vendor mitigation. The module uses two main HTTP endpoints: one for checking vulnerability and retrieving system information, and another for executing arbitrary commands via command injection. The exploit supports a variety of payloads, including reverse shells and Meterpreter sessions, and is designed for use within the Metasploit framework. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a typical Metasploit exploit module, with clear separation of check and exploit logic.Disclosed Jan 10, 2024 · Framework: metasploit · ruby · networkWeaponizedabyss-c2This repository is a multi-module Python offensive framework centered on exploiting HiSilicon DVR/NVR/IP camera devices via CVE-2020-25078, then managing compromised hosts through a Flask/SocketIO web panel. It is not a simple single-file PoC: it includes a control server (server.py), persistence and post-exploitation tooling, credential attacks, recon modules, web vulnerability scanners, network service checks, pivoting, reverse shell support, and a SQLite-backed datastore. Core exploit logic is in exploit.py and scanner.py. exploit.py probes numerous traversal/disclosure paths such as /../../.../mnt/mtd/Config/Account1 and related config/system files, parses returned content with multiple regex patterns to recover credentials, fingerprints device families, and falls back to known default credentials when disclosure succeeds but parsing does not. scanner.py operationalizes this by scanning IPs/CIDRs and common ports, checking liveness, fingerprinting likely cameras, invoking the CVE-2020-25078 checks, and storing recovered credentials in cameras.db. Post-exploitation capability is substantial. telnet_client.py provides raw Telnet login and command execution. botnet.py fans out commands across stored hosts. persistence.py installs SSH authorized_keys, cron, rc.local, init.d, systemd, inittab telnetd, and bind-shell style persistence. reverse_shell.py generates many Linux/IoT reverse shell one-liners and runs listeners. pivot_chain.py and socks_pivot.py support chained execution and local SOCKS5 pivoting through compromised hosts. Additional modules broaden scope beyond the HiSilicon exploit: brute.py and cred_spray.py perform credential attacks across Telnet, SSH, FTP, HTTP, SMB, databases, VNC, LDAP, WinRM, and more; network_exploit.py checks for exposed/misconfigured services and some well-known vulnerabilities such as MS17-010 and BlueKeep; web_exploit.py, web_cves.py, web_bugs.py, and web_brute.py scan websites for exposed files, CMS fingerprints, generic bug classes, and multiple CVE signatures. Recon/intel support includes ASN, DNS, GeoIP, JARM, WAF detection, proxy/Tor rotation, screenshot grabbing from camera snapshot endpoints, and Telegram/Discord/AbuseIPDB integrations. The repository structure is coherent and functional, with many CLI-capable modules and a central web UI in templates/index.html. Overall, this is an operational exploit-and-post-exploitation toolkit focused on HiSilicon IoT devices but expanded into a broader C2-style offensive platform.flags-alt · Disclosed May 20, 2026 · python · html · network · web · localOperationalCVE-2023-46805_CVE-2024-21887This repository provides two Bash proof-of-concept exploit scripts targeting Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure appliances (versions 9.x and 22.x) for CVE-2023-46805 (authentication bypass) and CVE-2024-21887 (command injection). The structure consists of two shell scripts and a detailed README. - CVE-2023-46805.sh exploits an authentication bypass by sending a crafted GET request to a system information endpoint, allowing unauthenticated access to restricted data. - CVE-2024-21887.sh exploits a command injection vulnerability by injecting a user-supplied command (URL-encoded) into a specific API endpoint, allowing an authenticated administrator to execute arbitrary commands on the appliance. The README provides usage instructions, example endpoints, and additional API paths that may be of interest for further exploitation or post-exploitation activities. The scripts require standard Unix utilities (curl, json_pp, xxd, tr, sed) and are intended for use in a command-line environment. No hardcoded IPs or credentials are present; the user supplies the target URL and, for the command injection, the payload command. The attack vector is network-based, targeting exposed web interfaces of vulnerable Ivanti appliances.duy-31 · Disclosed Jan 16, 2024 · bash · markdown · networkPoC
Exposure surface

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
IvantiConnect Secureapplication
IvantiPolicy Secureapplication
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2023-46805 exploited in the wild?
Yes. As of Nov 16, 2026, Mallory has reports of exploitation in the wild, and CISA added it to KEV on Jan 10, 2024.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2023-46805?
Yes. Mallory tracks 3 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2023-46805, the earliest disclosed Jan 10, 2024.
Is there a patch for CVE-2023-46805?
Apply Ivanti's current security updates for the affected Connect Secure or Policy Secure release. Published fixed Connect Secure releases include 9.1R14.4, 9.1R17.2, 9.1R18.3, 22.4R2.2, and 22.5R1.1; use the latest supported patched release rather than treating these historical fixes as a current security baseline.
What products are affected by CVE-2023-46805?
Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure.
How severe is CVE-2023-46805?
CVE-2023-46805 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 8.2 (High) and an EPSS score of 100.0% (100th percentile) as of Nov 16, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

126 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, and which detections to deploy tonight.
Exposure mappingQuery your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Threat actor evidence61Every report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malware75Malware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signatures9YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity12Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.