CVE-2023-50257 affects eProsima Fast DDS (formerly Fast RTPS), a C++ implementation of DDS. Even when SROS2 is applied, the RTPS fields used to disconnect nodes—specifically the data payload (p[UD]) and guid values—are not encrypted/protected, allowing an attacker to forge disconnect traffic. By sending a crafted disconnect packet using a publisher's identifier to the DDS Global Data Space multicast address 239.255.0.1:7400, an attacker can force connected Subscribers (Listeners) to disconnect from a Publisher (Talker). Repeated transmission of these spoofed disconnect packets can also prevent Subscribers from successfully establishing new connections. The issue has existed since the initial SecurityManager.cpp implementation (init, on_process_handshake) introduced on 2016-11-08 and affects versions prior to 2.13.0, 2.12.2, 2.11.3, 2.10.3, and 2.6.7.
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239.255.0.1:7400, to trusted hosts and segments only. Use network segmentation, multicast filtering, ACLs, and host/network monitoring to detect or block forged RTPS disconnect packets. These measures may reduce exposure but do not fully remediate the protocol-level weakness in affected versions.Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2023-50257, a vulnerability in ROS2's FastDDS implementation. The exploit consists of a Python script (ex.py) that captures RTPS (Real-Time Publish-Subscribe) packets on the local network, extracts protocol-specific identifiers (GUID and entity ID), and then sends a burst of 100 crafted RTPS packets to the ROS2 multicast group (239.255.0.1:7400). This action is intended to trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) condition, disrupting communication between ROS2 nodes. The Dockerfile sets up a complete ROS2 environment with the vulnerable versions of FastDDS and related dependencies, allowing for easy reproduction and testing of the exploit. The README.md provides detailed setup and usage instructions, including Docker-based environment preparation and step-by-step execution of the exploit. The main attack vector is network-based, targeting the multicast RTPS communication channel used by ROS2. The repository is structured for research and educational purposes, and the exploit requires root privileges and network access to the ROS2 environment.
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