A logic flaw in Omnissa Horizon Client for macOS allows a local attacker with user privileges to escalate privileges to root. The vulnerability is due to improper privilege management within the application, enabling an attacker to gain root access on the affected system.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a local macOS privilege-escalation exploit for CVE-2024-11467 targeting VMware Horizon Client’s privileged helper tool (CDSHelper). Structure: - README.md: Technical write-up describing the XPC Mach service (com.vmware.horizon.CDSHelper), reverse engineering notes, and the vulnerable job handler that supports operations like runscript/movefile/installpackage. It explains the core abuse: using the helper’s file-move job to relocate a root-owned, partially attacker-influenced file into /etc/sudoers.d/. - poc.c: C PoC that creates an XPC dictionary with keys `cdsjob=cdsjob_movefile`, `cds_movefile_srcfile=/var/log/install.log`, and `cds_movefile_dstdir=/etc/sudoers.d/myfile`, then connects to the Mach service `com.vmware.horizon.CDSHelper` and sends the message with a reply handler. - exploit.sh: Orchestrator script that (1) injects a sudoers line into /var/log/install.log using `logger` with a carriage return to force a new line, (2) runs the compiled PoC binary (expected as ./cdsjobexp) to move the log into /etc/sudoers.d/myfile, and (3) validates escalation by running `sudo touch /tmp/vmwarebeware` and checking the file is owned by UID 0. Main capability: local privilege escalation to root via unauthorized/insufficiently authorized XPC access to a privileged helper’s file-move functionality, enabling sudoers injection. No external network C2 is present; the key ‘endpoints’ are the Mach service name and sensitive filesystem paths.
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