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CVE-2024-1708 is a path traversal vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect affecting version 23.9.7 and earlier. The flaw is described as improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory and has been characterized as a Zip Slip issue in the ScreenConnect extension handling mechanism. A malicious extension archive can write files outside its intended subdirectory because archive contents are not sufficiently constrained during extraction. This arbitrary file write condition can be leveraged to overwrite files on the ScreenConnect server and, in suitable conditions, achieve remote code execution. The vulnerability has also been associated with direct impact to confidential data and critical systems, and has been actively exploited in the wild. Public reporting also notes that CVE-2024-1708 has frequently been chained with CVE-2024-1709, an authentication bypass in ScreenConnect, to obtain the access needed to exploit the file write path and compromise exposed self-hosted servers.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a small, focused exploit PoC for chained ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerabilities CVE-2024-1708 and CVE-2024-1709. Structure is minimal: a README with technical background, affected versions, reproduction steps, and mitigation guidance, plus a single Python exploit script. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. The Python script automates a 3-step attack chain against a remote ScreenConnect server: (1) probe the path traversal/auth bypass by requesting /SetupWizard.aspx/../../ScreenConnect/Login.aspx, (2) upload a randomly named ASPX webshell to /SetupWizard.aspx/../../ScreenConnect/UploadFile.aspx, optionally reusing a session cookie from the probe response, and (3) execute an arbitrary command by requesting the uploaded shell with ?cmd=<command>. The script supports HTTP or HTTPS, configurable target/port, and defaults to command execution of 'whoami'. The embedded payload is a C#/ASPX webshell that invokes cmd.exe /c <command> and returns stdout/stderr to the HTTP response. This makes the exploit operational rather than a simple detector: it provides direct remote command execution and persistence via a leftover webshell file. The code appears primarily tailored to Windows targets because the payload explicitly launches cmd.exe, although the README notes Linux installations may also be vulnerable. No destructive fake behavior is present; the repository is a genuine exploit PoC.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
66 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerability that Microsoft says Storm-1175 has exploited.
A ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerability previously exploited by Storm-1175 in campaigns that deployed Medusa ransomware.
A ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerability listed among CVEs mentioned in the discussions or references.
A path traversal vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect that CISA added to the KEV catalog and that the content states was exploited by Kimsuky.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.