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CVE-2024-3272 is a hard-coded credentials vulnerability affecting D-Link DNS-320L, DNS-325, DNS-327L, and DNS-340L NAS devices, with the affected-version cutoff listed as 20240403. The HTTP GET request handler accepts a built-in account with an empty password, allowing remote attackers to bypass authentication without legitimate user credentials. The vulnerability can be chained with the separate command injection vulnerability CVE-2024-3273 to execute arbitrary commands. The affected products were already end-of-life when the vulnerability was assigned, and no patches are available. Public exploits and active exploitation have been documented.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
This repository provides an operational exploit and patch tool for D-Link NAS devices vulnerable to CVE-2024-3272. The main exploit is implemented in Python (src/main.py), which interacts with the vulnerable /cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi endpoint on the target device. The tool can test for vulnerability, patch the device by disabling the system() call in the CGI binary, and optionally start or stop a telnet server for shell access. The patch is delivered as a base64-encoded shell script (src/patch.sh) that is executed on the device via command injection. The patch is not persistent and will be lost on reboot. The repository also includes documentation and decompiled function analysis (docs/decompiled-funcs.md) to aid understanding of the vulnerability and patch. The exploit targets D-Link NAS devices (such as DNS-320L) running vulnerable firmware, and the attack vector is network-based via HTTP. Key endpoints include the vulnerable CGI script and file paths involved in the patching process.
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10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A vulnerability in D-Link ShareCenter NAS exploited in a proxyjacking campaign that installed Pawns.app without device owners' consent to monetize their internet connections. The content does not describe the vulnerability's technical mechanism.
A vulnerability in D-Link ShareCenter NAS devices exploited by skynox7 to gain access and install Pawns.app without authorization for residential proxy monetization. The article does not distinguish this flaw's technical mechanism from the other D-Link vulnerability. The campaign compromised at least 143 devices across 34 countries collectively; per-vulnerability counts are not provided.
A vulnerability in D-Link ShareCenter NAS devices exploited in a proxyjacking campaign to install legitimate bandwidth-sharing software without authorization and monetize victims’ internet connections. The article does not describe the vulnerability’s technical mechanism.
A vulnerability affecting D-Link ShareCenter NAS that an unnamed actor exploited in a global proxyjacking campaign to install Pawns.app without device owners' consent. The content does not describe the vulnerability's technical mechanism.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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