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CVE-2024-3272 affects D-Link DNS-320L, DNS-325, DNS-327L, and DNS-340L NAS devices through 2024-04-03. The issue is in processing within /cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi, described as the HTTP GET request handler. Manipulation of the user argument with the value messagebus triggers use of hard-coded credentials. Public reporting also indicates the flaw can be leveraged to execute arbitrary base64-encoded commands on affected devices. The vulnerability is remotely exploitable and impacts end-of-life products that are no longer supported by the vendor.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
This repository provides an operational exploit and patch tool for D-Link NAS devices vulnerable to CVE-2024-3272. The main exploit is implemented in Python (src/main.py), which interacts with the vulnerable /cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi endpoint on the target device. The tool can test for vulnerability, patch the device by disabling the system() call in the CGI binary, and optionally start or stop a telnet server for shell access. The patch is delivered as a base64-encoded shell script (src/patch.sh) that is executed on the device via command injection. The patch is not persistent and will be lost on reboot. The repository also includes documentation and decompiled function analysis (docs/decompiled-funcs.md) to aid understanding of the vulnerability and patch. The exploit targets D-Link NAS devices (such as DNS-320L) running vulnerable firmware, and the attack vector is network-based via HTTP. Key endpoints include the vulnerable CGI script and file paths involved in the patching process.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A vulnerability explicitly identified as an exploitation target in ToxNetV2's automated propagation capability.
A vulnerability affecting multiple (older/EOL) D-Link NAS devices that allows execution of arbitrary base64-encoded commands; highlighted as actively targeted despite EOL status and lack of patches.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.