Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2024-43451 is a Windows NTLM hash disclosure spoofing vulnerability in the handling of specially crafted Internet Shortcut (.url) files. A malicious shortcut can specify an SMB file location under its URL value, causing Windows to initiate SMB authentication to an attacker-controlled server when the file is minimally interacted with. Reported trigger actions include selecting, right-clicking or inspecting the file; deletion and drag-and-drop can also trigger the behavior on certain Windows versions. The outbound authentication attempt exposes the logged-on user's NTLMv2 hash to the remote server. Microsoft addressed the actively exploited zero-day in its November 12, 2024 security updates.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a small, focused proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2024-43451, a Windows NTLM hash disclosure vulnerability involving malicious .url shortcut files. The repository contains two files: a README with vulnerability background, affected versions, setup, and reproduction guidance; and a single Python script, exploit.py, which is the operational entry point. The exploit does not directly attack a remote service itself; instead, it generates a crafted .url file containing an attacker-controlled UNC path in the IconFile field. When a victim on a vulnerable Windows system interacts with the file in Explorer—such as right-clicking, deleting, moving/copying it, or even rendering icons in some folder views—Windows attempts to retrieve the icon over SMB from the remote UNC path. That outbound SMB connection causes NTLM authentication to the attacker-controlled host, enabling capture of the victim's NTLMv2 hash. Structurally, exploit.py is straightforward: it parses command-line arguments, validates or constructs a UNC path from --ip/--share/--icon-file, builds the .url file contents via build_url_file(), optionally adjusts IconIndex, and writes the result to disk. It supports either a full custom UNC path via --unc or automatic construction from an attacker IP and share name. It also allows setting a target URL for double-click behavior, defaulting to about:blank. The script prints operator instructions for pairing the generated file with an SMB listener such as Responder or impacket-smbserver. Main exploit capability: generation of a malicious shortcut file for credential leakage. The practical result is NTLMv2 hash capture, which can then be cracked offline. This is an operational PoC rather than a detection script, and while the payload is simple and hardcoded in concept, it is configurable through command-line options.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
35 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A prior NTLM hash disclosure spoofing vulnerability referenced as a predecessor to CVE-2025-24054 and noted as exploited in real attacks.
An NTLM-related vulnerability referenced as an example of an NTLM flaw impacting 2025 (no technical details provided in the content).
A vulnerability in Microsoft Windows NTLM protocol, abused by threat actors for credential theft and post-exploitation activities.
A vulnerability in Windows MSHTML allows .url files to trigger NTLMv2 hash leaks with minimal user interaction, enabling credential theft and lateral movement. Exploited in the wild by APTs and cybercriminals for malware delivery and credential compromise.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.