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HighPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2024-4367: Arbitrary JavaScript execution in Mozilla PDF.js

Published May 14, 2024 · Updated 4 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
CVSS8.8High · v3.1
EPSS70.7%99th percentile
CISA KEVNoNot listed
In the wildNonePublic exploit, no exploitation reported
Vendors
Debian ProjectMozillaOpen-Xchange
IdentifiersCVE-2024-4367CWE-94

CVE-2024-4367 is an arbitrary JavaScript execution vulnerability in Mozilla PDF.js caused by a missing type check during PDF font handling. A specially crafted PDF can cause attacker-controlled JavaScript to execute in the PDF.js context when rendered. Affected Mozilla products include Firefox before 126, Firefox ESR before 115.11, and Thunderbird before 115.11. Applications embedding vulnerable PDF.js components are also exposed, including affected Gogs, Odoo, and Siemens Teamcenter deployments.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation compromises the JavaScript execution context of the PDF viewer. In web applications embedding the viewer, this can enable cross-site scripting, disclosure of data accessible to the viewer's origin, modification of displayed content, and actions using the victim's authenticated session. In affected Gogs deployments, potential consequences include session compromise and access to repository information available to the victim. Native operating-system code execution or a sandbox escape is not established by this vulnerability alone.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Until updates are deployed, avoid opening or previewing untrusted PDFs with affected viewers. Disable or restrict PDF preview functionality where possible, and limit repository upload permissions in affected Gogs deployments. Restrict access to affected application interfaces. For embedded web viewers, a strict Content Security Policy and origin isolation may reduce exposure or impact where supported, but do not replace patching.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade Firefox to 126 or later, Firefox ESR to 115.11 or later, and Thunderbird to 115.11 or later, preferably using currently supported releases or vendor-patched distribution packages. Update applications that bundle vulnerable PDF.js rather than relying solely on browser updates. Upgrade Gogs to 0.13.3 or later, which replaces its obsolete PDF.js component with version 5.2.133. For Siemens Teamcenter, apply V2312.0009 or later within the V2312 branch, or V2406.0006 or later within the V2406 branch. Fixed Odoo versions are not specified.

Public exploits

Exploits

29 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis. Hidden: 5 rejected by Mallory's analysis as not a working exploit; 6 not yet analyzed, such as Exploit-DB entries. Showing the 25 most capable, earliest first.

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PDFernetRemoteloThis repository contains a proof-of-concept exploit script (PDFernetRemotelo.py) that demonstrates remote code execution by chaining two vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-4367 (PDF exploit) and CVE-2023-38831 (WinRAR exploit). The main script is written in Python and automates the creation of a malicious PDF and a specially crafted RAR archive. The workflow is as follows: 1. The attacker provides their IP and port, which are used to configure a batch script that opens a reverse shell using ncat. 2. The script generates a bait PDF and a batch file, then creates a malicious RAR archive exploiting the WinRAR vulnerability. 3. It also generates a malicious PDF file that, when opened in a vulnerable version of Firefox, triggers the download of the malicious RAR file. 4. The script starts a local HTTP server to host the malicious files and prints a URL (http://<attacker_ip>/poc.pdf) for the attacker to send to the victim. 5. If the victim opens the PDF and extracts/executes the RAR contents, the batch script is run, connecting back to the attacker's machine and granting remote command execution. The repository includes a README.md with background information and usage instructions. The exploit targets Windows systems with specific vulnerable versions of WinRAR and Firefox. The main attack vectors are network (HTTP delivery and reverse shell) and file-based (malicious PDF and RAR).UnHackerEnCapital · Disclosed Jun 19, 2024 · python · network · fileOperationalWEAPONIZING-CVE-2024-4367This repository provides a fully operational exploit for CVE-2024-4367, a critical vulnerability in PDF.js that allows arbitrary JavaScript execution via insufficient type checks on the FontMatrix object. The main script, 'cve_2024_4367_exploit_wizard.py', is a Python 3 wizard that automates the attack workflow: 1. It verifies and installs dependencies (PyPDF2 and SET), 2. Creates a malicious PDF by injecting a JavaScript payload into the FontMatrix field of a provided 'template.pdf', 3. Manages a list of campaign targets (e.g., email addresses), 4. Integrates with the Social Engineering Toolkit (SET) to facilitate phishing campaigns for delivering the malicious PDF, 5. Hosts the malicious PDF on a local HTTP server (http://localhost:8080), which also logs any exfiltrated data (such as cookies) sent by the JavaScript payload when the PDF is opened in a vulnerable PDF.js environment. The payload is hardcoded to exfiltrate document cookies to a local endpoint, but the script and README provide guidance for customizing the payload for other actions. The repository is structured with a single Python exploit script and a detailed README that explains setup, usage, and legal considerations. The exploit is intended for educational and authorized penetration testing only.exfil0 · Disclosed Jan 5, 2025 · python · browser · phishing · localOperationalCVE-2024-4367-POC-PDFJSThis repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2024-4367, demonstrating XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) attacks via malicious PDF files. The structure includes: - A Python script (payload/poc.py) that generates malicious PDF files by embedding arbitrary JavaScript payloads in the /FontMatrix of a PDF font object. - Several pre-generated PDF payloads (alert.pdf, calculatrice.pdf, cookies.pdf, keylogger.pdf, localstorage.pdf, redirection.pdf) each containing different JavaScript exploits, such as alert popups, cookie theft, localStorage exfiltration, keylogging, and redirection. - An Electron-based PDF viewer (index.js, html/pdfviewer.html) that loads and renders PDF files. The viewer is intentionally insecure, with nodeIntegration enabled and contextIsolation disabled, making it vulnerable to JavaScript execution and, in the case of Electron, arbitrary command execution (e.g., launching calc.exe). - A Node.js Express server (server.js) that acts as a malicious endpoint, receiving exfiltrated data (cookies, localStorage, keylogger data, etc.) and serving the malicious PDF viewer. - The readme.md provides detailed instructions and explanations for each attack scenario, including code samples for XSS, phishing, DDoS, and desktop command execution. The main exploit capability is to generate and deliver PDF files that, when opened in a vulnerable viewer, execute attacker-controlled JavaScript. This can lead to theft of sensitive data, phishing, DDoS, and, in desktop environments like Electron, full system compromise. The repository is operational, with working payloads and a server to receive exfiltrated data. Multiple fingerprintable endpoints are used for data exfiltration and attack demonstration.elamani-drawing · Disclosed Mar 25, 2025 · python · javascript · browser · local · networkOperationalcve-2024-4367-pocThis repository is a small standalone proof-of-concept for CVE-2024-4367 in PDF.js. It contains one Python script, pdf-modify.py, plus a README and license. The script is the sole exploit component and works by opening a local base PDF, hex-encoding its contents, locating the hex representation of the literal string "PLACEHOLDER", and replacing every occurrence with a crafted /FontMatrix string that embeds JavaScript intended to execute when the PDF is rendered by a vulnerable PDF.js instance. The currently active payload is operational rather than a benign PoC: it injects JavaScript that issues a fetch request to https://acme.safesecureproxy.xyz/catch?c= concatenated with document.cookie, enabling cookie exfiltration from the victim context. Several commented payloads demonstrate other exploit capabilities: displaying alert boxes to prove code execution, logging sensitive browser data such as document.referrer, document.domain, document.cookie, localStorage, and sessionStorage, fetching remote JavaScript from an attacker-controlled host, redirecting the victim to a login page, opening a new tab, and enumerating window properties for exfiltration. Repository structure is minimal: README.md explains usage, requiring a local file named CVE-2024-4367-POC-base-placeholder.pdf and manual editing/uncommenting of payload_new; pdf-modify.py performs the binary replacement and writes a timestamped malicious PDF to disk. There is no exploit framework, no network scanning, and no target discovery logic. The exploit is file-based and depends on subsequent browser-side rendering in vulnerable PDF.js, making the effective attack chain file -> browser/web execution. The code is a valid exploit builder, not a detector, and not merely documentation.AnomalousVectors · Disclosed Jun 28, 2025 · python · file · browser · webOperationalCVE-2024-4367-hands-on-01This repository is primarily a hands-on/lab environment for CVE-2024-4367 in PDF.js, not just a standalone exploit. The core exploit is CVE-2024-4367-PoC/CVE-2024-4367.py, a Python script that generates a malicious PDF by embedding attacker-controlled JavaScript into the PDF FontMatrix structure. When the resulting poc.pdf is opened by a vulnerable PDF.js consumer, the injected JavaScript executes in the PDF.js/hosting origin context. The README explicitly demonstrates both browser-context JavaScript execution (e.g., alert(document.domain)) and, in Electron-style environments, command execution via require('child_process').exec(...). Repository structure: (1) CVE-2024-4367-PoC/ contains the actual exploit generator and exploit README; (2) firefox.py automates downloading specific Firefox Nightly builds and launching poc.pdf to demonstrate vulnerable vs patched behavior; (3) pdfjs_diff_font_renderer.js is a diff artifact showing vulnerable vs fixed font renderer logic; (4) the rest of the repository is largely a PDF.js code/examples tree, including browser examples, Node examples, and a Chromium extension implementation. Those files are mostly supporting context for understanding or reproducing the vulnerability rather than additional exploit stages. Main exploit capability: arbitrary JavaScript execution triggered by opening a crafted PDF file. Secondary capability: potential local command execution in Electron-based hosts where Node integration is exposed. There is no built-in network callback, C2, or exfiltration logic in the exploit itself; payload behavior is entirely user-supplied JavaScript. The exploit is file-delivered and relies on a victim opening the generated PDF in a vulnerable PDF.js environment. The included Firefox launcher script and versioned Nightly download URLs make the repository useful for reproducible testing and patch verification.yuimamur · Disclosed Jul 27, 2026 · python · javascript · file · browser · webOperationalcpc-pdfjs-pocThe repository consists of one 2,137-byte PDF proof of concept, poc_xss_cve-2024-4367.pdf. It is a crafted PDF document rather than a conventional source-code project. The malicious content is embedded in a Type1 font's /FontMatrix field, where data intended to be a numeric matrix is terminated and followed by JavaScript. Vulnerable PDF.js versions evaluate the resulting generated font-processing code, causing the embedded script to run in the PDF viewer's browser origin. The hard-coded proof-of-concept payload modifies the DOM to show the current document.domain and the value of localStorage.Token. No network URL, IP address, domain, command-and-control host, or data-exfiltration request is present. This is an operational XSS demonstration for CVE-2024-4367, not a detection tool or framework module.stuara1 · Disclosed Sep 27, 2026 · pdf · javascript · file · browserOperationalcve-2024-4367-pocThe repository contains one 26,505-byte PDF and no standalone exploit scripts, build files, or documentation. The PDF embeds a short JavaScript injection rather than a conventional PDF JavaScript action. Its catalog and page tree define one page; object 4 selects font /F1 and renders the character F using text rendering mode 7, which creates a text clipping path. Object 6 defines a Type1 font whose /FontMatrix contains five numeric values followed by a malicious string. Objects 7 and 9 supply the font descriptor and an ASCII85-encoded embedded font stream. This structure matches the PDF.js FontMatrix code-injection technique associated with CVE-2024-4367, fixed in PDF.js 4.2.67. The visible payload is a hardcoded alert(1) demonstration, with no observable external endpoints or post-exploitation behavior. Analysis is static: the font stream is truncated in the supplied content, so complete PDF validity, embedded-font contents, and successful execution cannot be verified. Repository URL, revision, and archive size were not supplied; the file size is known, but archive size is represented as 0.weae26 · Disclosed Oct 5, 2026 · javascript · file · browserOperationalDocker-Lab-CVE-2024-4367This is a standalone Docker reproduction lab for CVE-2024-4367, not an exploit-framework module or detection script. Four apparently identical PDF samples contain an attacker-controlled string in a Type1 font's /FontMatrix array. The intended vulnerable PDF.js font-compilation path incorporates this value into generated JavaScript, allowing execution in the viewer's origin. The concrete payload attempts cookie exfiltration by HTTP POST to http://192.168.139.133/test; native OS code execution is not demonstrated. The 100-file inventory contains 12 first-party documentation, configuration, viewer, automation, and PDF files, plus 88 vendored dependency files. There are 31 JavaScript/MJS or extensionless JavaScript files and 16 TypeScript declaration files, reported as 47 code files; HTML, Docker build recipes, and the four PDF payload artifacts are additional executable or supporting content. docker-compose.yml connects a Python static HTTP server at 172.25.0.10 with a Node.js/Puppeteer browser at 172.25.0.11. viewer.mjs reads the file query parameter and renders the PDF's first page on a canvas. index.js scans /uploads, sets a hardcoded non-HttpOnly auth_token cookie, opens each PDF through the viewer with a three-second navigation timeout, closes the page, and repeats after 30 seconds. Chromium is launched with --no-sandbox and --disable-setuid-sandbox; these settings weaken isolation but do not constitute an implemented escape. Important completeness limits: the referenced PDF.js library and worker are missing from the supplied inventory, their actual versions cannot be verified, and the Puppeteer Dockerfile requires a top-level package.json that is also not listed. The upload web form mentioned in the README and the collection server are not included. The uploads bind mount hides the baked-in PDF samples unless they are also present in the host directory. Browser security policies and endpoint reachability can affect exfiltration, and navigation-success logs do not verify payload execution. Dependency browser-download URLs are benign infrastructure references rather than attacker collectors. The Dockerfile's rm -rf removes apt cache files only and is not evidence of a fake exploit. Analysis is static, some dependency contents are truncated, and no execution success was verified. Repository URL, git reference, and archive size were not provided; empty strings and zero represent unavailable metadata.lewiskb · Disclosed Oct 10, 2026 · javascript · typescript · file · browser · webOperationalaia-pdfjs-pocThe supplied repository contains README.md and one standalone Python 3 exploit generator, gen_pdf3.py. It targets CVE-2024-4367, in which insufficient validation of PDF FontMatrix elements allows attacker-controlled strings to reach dynamically generated JavaScript through glyph-path compilation. The README identifies a specific AIA-hosted PDF.js 2.0.943 viewer and claims authorized testing, but authorization and execution results cannot be independently established from these files. The build(payload) function constructs a single-page PDF with ten objects, a Type1 font dictionary containing the injected FontMatrix, Pattern resources, text-rendering content, and calculated cross-reference offsets. It escapes PDF literal-string delimiters in the supplied JavaScript. Pattern fill selects a glyph-path rendering route, while 24 text-show operations are intended to mitigate a worker/main-thread timing race. The main entry point accepts an output path and optional JavaScript payload, writes the PDF locally, and prints its size and payload. It makes no network requests itself and has no external Python dependencies. The default payload is a benign execution marker, but replacement JavaScript enables arbitrary actions within the viewer's browser security context. The README includes alert and cookie-exfiltration examples, delivery instructions, claimed control experiments, and mitigations such as upgrading PDF.js, disabling evaluation, restricting remote PDF sources, and isolating the viewer. This is functional exploit-generation code rather than a detector or README-only submission. Browser execution was not verified; the generated font stream declares a length of 800 despite being effectively empty, so successful rendering also depends on the target parser's recovery behavior. The listed poc.pdf artifact is not included. Original repository URL, analyzed git reference, and archive size were not supplied; empty strings and zero represent unavailable repository metadata.weae26 · Disclosed Oct 28, 2026 · python · file · browser · webOperationalCVE-2024-4367The repository contains a standalone Python 3 PDF generator and a prebuilt malicious PDF, totaling 5,861 bytes according to the supplied file sizes. No framework integration, dependencies beyond Python's standard library, or repository metadata were provided; archive size is unknown. The exploit targets CVE-2024-4367 by placing a JavaScript-bearing string in a Type1 font's FontMatrix array. Vulnerable PDF.js font-rendering code incorporates that value into generated JavaScript, allowing execution when the relevant glyphs render. This is not an ordinary PDF JavaScript action: the PDF's OpenAction only selects the page and fit mode. The bundled payload attempts an image-based HTTPS callback and does not itself install malware, open a shell, or execute an operating-system command. poc_cve_2024_4367.py implements PDF string escaping, builds the document, calculates object offsets and the cross-reference table, writes a user-selected output file, checks that startxref points to xref, and prints a SHA-256 digest. It supports arbitrary supplied JavaScript and an optional beacon intended to report the viewer's origin and document domain. The generator itself makes no network requests. Notable limitations: beacon mode omits the required string-concatenation syntax before &d, producing invalid JavaScript. Also, startxref is calculated using the Python character count rather than the encoded byte count, so non-ASCII payloads can invalidate that offset despite the stated arbitrary-payload support. The template retains fixed stream lengths, including a declared 800-byte font stream with no corresponding font data; its structural check does not establish full PDF validity or successful exploitation. The bundled PDF uses its own callback payload and is not affected by the generator's beacon-construction error. No execution or viewer-based validation was performed.minhi1 · Disclosed Nov 2, 2026 · python · javascript · file · browserOperationalCVE-2024-4367The repository contains a README, one standalone Python PDF generator, and two PDF documents containing executable JavaScript. It exploits CVE-2024-4367 by placing JavaScript in a nonnumeric /FontMatrix element that vulnerable pdf.js incorporates into dynamically compiled glyph-rendering code. An intentionally empty /FontFile3 stream preserves the attacker-controlled matrix through font fallback. This is browser-origin code execution, not demonstrated operating-system command execution. The payload targets a Health Catalyst viewer deployment and its Products API. It reads the origin's Okta token store, extracts the access token, and attempts an authenticated cross-origin request to /sources. Response readability depends on the target's CORS configuration; the repository's claims about that deployment were not independently verified. The most important finding is a material mismatch between documentation, generator, and supplied artifact. README.md claims that credentials are never transmitted in full, but poc-oob-fetch.pdf contains an additional sendFull() function absent from generate-poc-pdf.py. With an oob destination present, it attempts to POST the entire raw token store and bearer token twice, alongside metadata image beacons. The raw store may include ID and refresh tokens if present. Regenerating the silent PDF from the supplied script therefore does not reproduce this additional behavior. The claim that nothing is transmitted without oob is also misleading: the hardcoded API request still runs, carrying the full bearer token when available. The visual variant serializes the complete result object into the DOM, exposing raw credentials locally rather than merely displaying a token prefix. Cookie inspection measures only document.cookie length; it cannot establish the absence of HttpOnly cookies. No exploit framework, stager, or external JavaScript dependency is present. Analysis is static and does not establish that the named deployment remains vulnerable. Repository URL and branch are inferred from the README's raw GitHub link. Archive size was not supplied, so size_bytes is 0; the listed file sizes total 16,741 bytes. The code-file count includes both PDFs because they contain executable JavaScript.remiBoudreau · Disclosed Nov 7, 2026 · python · javascript · browser · file · webOperationalcve-2024-4367-pocThe repository contains a 38-byte README naming CVE-2024-4367 and a 1,879-byte PDF containing an embedded JavaScript injection payload. There are no standalone scripts, dependencies, build files, framework integrations, or configurable payload handlers. The PDF is counted as the single code-bearing file because it embeds JavaScript. The malicious value appears in font object 5's /FontMatrix array, where a PDF string replaces an expected numeric element. Its escaped parentheses decode into syntax intended to terminate a generated JavaScript statement, execute alert(document.cookie), and comment out trailing generated code. Page content selects the associated /F1 font and draws text, providing a potential rendering trigger. This targets PDF.js font-code generation rather than a conventional PDF JavaScript action; /OpenAction merely fits the page to the viewer. The supplied artifact has notable structural problems, including an empty font stream despite a declared length of 800 bytes and cross-reference offsets/startxref inconsistent with the supplied file size. These may require parser recovery or prevent the vulnerable rendering path from being reached, so successful exploitation cannot be confirmed from static inspection. No network destinations, external URLs, filesystem access, persistence, or exfiltration mechanisms are present. Repository URL, revision, and archive size were not supplied; their fields are left empty or zero rather than inferred from individual file sizes.SeVen-777777 · Disclosed Nov 14, 2026 · javascript · file · browserOperationalCVE-2024-4367-PoCThis repository provides a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2024-4367 and CVE-2024-34342, which are vulnerabilities in PDF.js (used by Firefox, Firefox ESR, and Thunderbird) that allow arbitrary JavaScript execution when a malicious PDF is opened. The repository contains two files: a Python script (CVE-2024-4367.py) and a README.md. The Python script generates a malicious PDF file (poc.pdf) embedding attacker-supplied JavaScript payloads. The README explains the vulnerability, affected products, and provides usage examples for both JavaScript and OS command execution (the latter in Electron-based apps). The exploit requires the victim to open the generated PDF with a vulnerable application. The main attack vector is a crafted file (PDF) that, when opened, triggers the vulnerability. No network endpoints or external IPs/domains are present in the code. The exploit is operational, allowing arbitrary payloads to be embedded and executed in the target context.LOURC0D3 · Disclosed May 20, 2024 · python · filePoCCVE-2024-4367-POCThis repository is a proof-of-concept (POC) exploit for CVE-2024-4367, a vulnerability in Mozilla's PDF.js that allows arbitrary JavaScript execution when a specially crafted PDF is opened. The repository contains three files: a README.md with usage instructions and references, a Python script (poc.py) that generates a malicious PDF file embedding attacker-supplied JavaScript, and a sample malicious.pdf. The exploit works by injecting the JavaScript payload into the PDF's FontMatrix field, which is then executed by vulnerable PDF.js instances. The main attack vector is a crafted PDF file, and the primary fingerprintable endpoint is the generated malicious PDF. The exploit is a POC and does not include advanced payloads or automation for delivery; it simply demonstrates the vulnerability by allowing the user to specify arbitrary JavaScript to be executed upon opening the PDF.s4vvysec · Disclosed May 20, 2024 · python · filePoCpdfjs-vuln-demoThis repository is a proof-of-concept (POC) project demonstrating exploitation of CVE-2024-4367, a vulnerability in the PDF.js (pdfjs-dist) library. The project is structured as a web application using the Astro framework, with React, Vue, and Svelte components for rendering PDFs via PDF.js. The /public directory contains several crafted PDF files, each designed to exploit the vulnerability in different ways: - 'ex1.pdf' triggers a simple JavaScript alert. - 'CVE-2024-4367-v1.pdf' demonstrates access to window.origin and PDFViewerApplication.url via alert. - 'ex-gist.pdf' and 'ex-voice.pdf' fetch and execute remote JavaScript code from gist.githubusercontent.com using fetch and eval. - 'ex-joke.pdf' fetches a joke from icanhazdadjoke.com and logs it, demonstrating arbitrary fetch capability. The exploit works by embedding JavaScript in the /FontMatrix property of a PDF font object, which is then executed by the vulnerable PDF.js library when the PDF is loaded in the browser. The application allows users to select which PDF to load in each frontend framework, making it easy to test the exploit in different environments. The main exploit capability is browser-based arbitrary JavaScript execution (XSS/RCE) via malicious PDF files. The repository is a clear, educational POC and does not include weaponized or automated exploitation tools.clarkio · Disclosed May 22, 2024 · javascript · typescript · browserPoCcve-2024-4367-PoC-fixedThis repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2024-4367, a vulnerability in Mozilla's PDF.js library that allows for arbitrary JavaScript execution when a specially crafted PDF file is opened. The exploit is implemented in a single Python script ('cve-2024-4367.py'), which takes a user-supplied JavaScript payload and embeds it into a malicious PDF file ('poc.pdf'). The README.md explains the impact and affected products, specifically highlighting Firefox versions prior to 126 and any applications using PDF.js for PDF rendering. The exploit does not target a network service directly but relies on the victim opening the generated PDF file in a vulnerable environment, making the attack vector local (user-assisted) and browser-based. The repository is structured simply, with a license, a brief README, and the main exploit script. No hardcoded network endpoints or IP addresses are present; the only fingerprintable artifact is the generated malicious PDF file.Zombie-Kaiser · Disclosed Jun 13, 2024 · python · local · browserPoCpdfjs-vuln-demoThis repository is a proof-of-concept (POC) project demonstrating exploitation of CVE-2024-4367, a vulnerability in the PDF.js (pdfjs-dist) library. The project is structured as a web application using the Astro framework, with React, Vue, and Svelte components for rendering PDFs via PDF.js. The /public directory contains several PDF files, some of which are crafted to exploit the vulnerability by embedding malicious JavaScript in the /FontMatrix property of a font object within the PDF. When these PDFs are rendered by PDF.js in the browser, the JavaScript is executed in the context of the web page, allowing for actions such as displaying alerts, fetching and executing remote JavaScript code, or exfiltrating data via network requests. The exploit demonstrates both simple payloads (e.g., alert popups) and more advanced payloads (e.g., fetching and evaluating remote code, or fetching data from external APIs). The repository is intended for demonstration and educational purposes, highlighting the impact of the vulnerability and the risks of rendering untrusted PDFs in the browser.snyk-labs · Disclosed Jun 17, 2024 · javascript · typescript · browserPoCCVE-2024-4367-AnalysisThis repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2024-4367, a critical vulnerability in PDF.js that allows arbitrary JavaScript execution (XSS) when a crafted PDF is opened in a vulnerable environment. The repository contains: - A Python script (poc/poc.py) that generates a malicious PDF file (poc.pdf) embedding a user-supplied JavaScript payload in the FontMatrix field of a font object. This PDF, when opened in a vulnerable PDF.js instance (such as in outdated Firefox or Thunderbird), triggers the JavaScript payload. - A Node.js Express application (app/server.js) serving a simple web interface (app/public/index.html) for uploading and viewing PDFs using pdfjs-dist 3.1.81, which is a vulnerable version. This allows for local demonstration and testing of the exploit. - The README.md provides clear usage instructions, affected product versions, mitigation advice, and references to further analysis and related PoCs. The exploit demonstrates the vulnerability by generating a PDF that, when rendered, executes arbitrary JavaScript in the browser context. The attack vector is browser-based, requiring user interaction (opening the malicious PDF). The repository is structured for both automated PDF generation and local demonstration via a web server.Masamuneee · Disclosed Sep 4, 2024 · python · javascript · browserPoCCVE-2024-4367-PoCThis repository provides a Proof of Concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2024-4367, a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability. The main exploit is delivered as a crafted PDF file ('CVE-2024-4367-PoC.pdf') that contains embedded JavaScript code. When the PDF is opened in a vulnerable environment (such as a web application or PDF viewer that improperly handles embedded JavaScript), the payload executes and collects a wide range of information from the victim's browser. This includes domain, URL, cookies, local and session storage, user agent, screen and device details, browser plugins, geolocation availability, and more. The information is displayed via a series of alert dialogs, demonstrating the impact of the XSS vulnerability. The repository also includes a README.md with detailed descriptions of the exploit's capabilities and sample output images (referenced but not included in the archive). There are no hardcoded network endpoints or external domains in the payload; the exploit is focused on local browser data exfiltration and demonstration. The structure is simple, with the main exploit in the PDF file, a README, a license, and a sample directory with a text file.kabiri-labs · Disclosed Feb 17, 2025 · javascript · pdf · browserPoCCVE-2024-4367This repository provides a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2024-4367, targeting a vulnerability in PDF processing. The main file, CVE-2024-4367.py, is a Python script that generates a malicious PDF file (poc.pdf) with a user-supplied payload injected into the PDF's FontMatrix field. The payload can be arbitrary JavaScript or system commands, such as launching the Windows calculator or triggering an alert dialog. The repository also includes two example malicious PDF files: win_calc.pdf (which attempts to execute 'calc' via Node.js child_process) and xss.pdf (which triggers a JavaScript alert). The exploit requires the victim to open the generated PDF with a vulnerable application, at which point the injected code is executed. The structure is straightforward: one Python generator script and two sample payload PDFs. No network endpoints or external domains are involved; the attack vector is a crafted file delivered to the target.VVeakee · Disclosed Apr 6, 2025 · python · filePoCcve-pdf-hostThis repository contains two PDF files, 'exploit.pdf' and 'poc.pdf', both of which are weaponized with embedded JavaScript code. The JavaScript is obfuscated within the PDF font metadata and is designed to exploit a target that processes PDFs and allows JavaScript execution. The exploit attempts to fetch a sensitive file ('flag.pdf') from the server (either via a local path or a relative path) and exfiltrate its contents to an attacker-controlled endpoint (either 'https://ha.requestcatcher.com' or 'https://webhook.site'). The structure of the repository is minimal, containing only the two crafted PDF files, each serving as a proof-of-concept for file exfiltration via malicious PDF. No explicit CVE or targeted product is mentioned, but the exploit is likely aimed at web applications or PDF readers that unsafely execute JavaScript in PDFs. The attack vector is browser-based, requiring the target to open the malicious PDF in a vulnerable environment.BektiHandoyo · Disclosed Apr 12, 2025 · pdf · javascript · browserPoCHacking-pdf.js-vulnerabilityThis repository is a proof-of-concept (PoC) and educational demonstration for CVE-2024-4367, a high-severity vulnerability in Mozilla's PDF.js library. The vulnerability allows arbitrary JavaScript execution via improper type checking in the font handling code, specifically through the /FontMatrix array in embedded fonts. The repository contains several malicious PDF files (e.g., ex1.pdf, ex-gist.pdf, ex-voice.pdf, ex-joke.pdf) that exploit this flaw by embedding JavaScript code or code that fetches and executes remote scripts. The exploit is demonstrated in a web application built with Astro, React, Vue, and Svelte, using vulnerable versions of PDF.js (via react-pdf and pdfjs-dist). The main exploit vector is opening a malicious PDF in a vulnerable PDF.js-based viewer with dynamic code execution enabled, leading to arbitrary JavaScript execution in the browser or Electron context. The repository also includes mitigation advice and a technical report. Notable endpoints include remote scripts hosted on gist.githubusercontent.com and an API endpoint at icanhazdadjoke.com, which are accessed by the malicious PDFs to demonstrate remote code execution and data exfiltration capabilities.Bhavyakcwestern · Disclosed Apr 14, 2025 · typescript · javascript · browser · localPoCCVE-2024-4367-hands-onThis repository provides a hands-on proof-of-concept (PoC) for CVE-2024-4367, a vulnerability in Mozilla Firefox's PDF.js component that allows JavaScript execution via a crafted PDF file. The repository includes: - A Python script (firefox.py) that automates downloading specific Firefox Nightly builds (vulnerable and patched), unpacks them, and opens a provided PDF file (poc.pdf) to demonstrate the exploit or its mitigation. - Instructions in the README.md for generating a malicious PDF using an external PoC script (referenced as a submodule) and for testing both vulnerable and patched Firefox versions. - A JavaScript diff file (pdfjs_diff_font_renderer.js) showing the differences between vulnerable and fixed versions of PDF.js's font renderer, aiding in understanding the vulnerability. - Submodules for the PoC generator and both vulnerable and fixed PDF.js source trees. The exploit demonstrates that opening a crafted PDF in a vulnerable Firefox Nightly build results in JavaScript execution (e.g., an alert box), confirming the vulnerability. The repository is structured for educational purposes, allowing users to observe the vulnerability and its remediation.PenguinCabinet · Disclosed May 16, 2025 · python · javascript · browserPoCcve-2024-4367-pocThis repository provides a proof-of-concept (POC) exploit for CVE-2024-4367, a vulnerability in Mozilla's PDF.js library that allows arbitrary JavaScript execution via crafted PDF files. The main script, 'pdf-modify.py', is a Python tool that takes a base PDF file containing a 'PLACEHOLDER' string and replaces it with a user-defined JavaScript payload. Several example payloads are provided in the script as commented lines, including ones that exfiltrate cookies or open remote URLs. The default payload in the script sends the victim's cookies to 'https://acme.safesecureproxy.xyz/catch?c='. The exploit does not include a payload delivery mechanism but generates a malicious PDF for use in further attacks. The repository is structured simply, with a license, a README explaining usage, and the main exploit script. No detection or fake code is present; this is a functional POC for the specified CVE.pS3ud0RAnD0m · Disclosed Jun 28, 2025 · python · browserPoCPOC_CVE-2024-4367This repository contains four files, all of which are PDF documents or raw PDF data. The files are named 'POC', 'POC.pdf', 'POC_XSS.pdf', and 'POC_XSS_test'. Each file is a crafted PDF designed to demonstrate exploitation of a browser-based PDF viewer via embedded JavaScript in the font encoding or FontMatrix. The payloads include JavaScript code such as alert('document.location'), alert('document.origin'), and alert(document.location.origin), which are typical for XSS proof-of-concept. Notably, 'POC_XSS.pdf' contains a more advanced payload that attempts to exfiltrate the victim's localStorage access token to an external endpoint (https://webhook.site/acfff587-0497-4205-be3c-1d44f3a6c6b8/?c=). The repository serves as a proof-of-concept for exploiting XSS vulnerabilities in PDF viewers that improperly handle embedded JavaScript, demonstrating both alert-based and data exfiltration attacks. No source code is present; all logic is embedded within the PDF structure.MihranGIT · Disclosed Aug 3, 2025 · pdf · browserPoC
Exposure surface

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
Debian ProjectDebian Linuxoperating_system
MozillaFirefoxapplication
MozillaFirefox Esrapplication
MozillaThunderbirdapplication
Open-XchangeOpen-Xchange Appsuite Frontendapplication
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2024-4367 exploited in the wild?
As of Nov 14, 2026, Mallory has no reports of CVE-2024-4367 being exploited in the wild. It is not listed in CISA KEV.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2024-4367?
Yes. Mallory tracks 29 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2024-4367, the earliest disclosed May 20, 2024.
Is there a patch for CVE-2024-4367?
Upgrade Firefox to 126 or later, Firefox ESR to 115.11 or later, and Thunderbird to 115.11 or later, preferably using currently supported releases or vendor-patched distribution packages. Update applications that bundle vulnerable PDF.js rather than relying solely on browser updates.
What products are affected by CVE-2024-4367?
Mozilla Firefox, Mozilla Firefox Esr, Mozilla Thunderbird, Debian Project Debian Linux, and Open-Xchange Appsuite Frontend.
How severe is CVE-2024-4367?
CVE-2024-4367 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 8.8 (High) and an EPSS score of 70.7% (99th percentile) as of Nov 14, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

54 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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tenable nessus pluginsNews · Nov 13, 2026Unity Linux 20.1070e Security Update: firefox (UTSA-2026-154211) | Tenable®A missing type check in PDF.js font handling permits arbitrary JavaScript execution within the PDF.js context. The advisory identifies an affected Firefox package on Unity Linux 20 and recommends updating it. Nessus detection relies on the application's self-reported version rather than testing exploitation. Exploits are reported as available, and the patch publication date is November 13, 2026.Read more ↗nuclei templates pull requestsNews · Nov 8, 2026feat(cves): add template for CVE-2024-4367 (Mozilla PDF.js Arbitrary JS Execution) by jankesec · Pull Request #17737 · projectdiscovery/nuclei-templatesAn arbitrary JavaScript execution vulnerability in Mozilla PDF.js. The content concerns adding a Nuclei template for the vulnerability but provides no substantive exploitation, impact, or remediation details.Read more ↗tenable nessus pluginsNews · Nov 4, 2026TencentOS Server 2: webkitgtk4 (TSSA-2026:1366) | Tenable®Referenced by a TencentOS Server 2 security check for webkitgtk4. The specific vulnerability mechanism is not described. Exploit availability is reported at the check level without an explicit per-CVE mapping.Read more ↗nuclei templates pull requestsNews · Oct 25, 2026Add CVE-2024-4367 - Odoo bundled PDF.js arbitrary JS execution by kosoyyagent · Pull Request #17525 · projectdiscovery/nuclei-templatesAn arbitrary JavaScript execution vulnerability in PDF.js bundled with Odoo. The content references a code contribution concerning this vulnerability but provides no technical exploitation details.Read more ↗
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Threat actor evidenceEvery report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malwareMalware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signatures1YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity6Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.