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HighPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2024-7344: UEFI Secure Boot bypass in Howyar Reloader

Published Jan 14, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVSS8.2High · v3.1
EPSS1.1%66th percentile
CISA KEVNoNot listed
In the wildReported2 exploitation records in Mallory
Vendors
WasaySanfongGreenwareSignalcomputerCs-GrpRadixHowyar
IdentifiersCVE-2024-7344CWE-347 · Improper Verification of…

CVE-2024-7344 is a signature-verification vulnerability in the 32-bit and 64-bit Howyar Reloader UEFI application, signed with the Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011 certificate. Its custom PE loader decodes, manually maps, and executes an image from a hard-coded location on the EFI System Partition instead of using the standard UEFI LoadImage and StartImage functions. Consequently, the child image bypasses platform Secure Boot verification, permitting unsigned code execution in the UEFI context even when Secure Boot is enabled. The vulnerable application is distributed with system recovery utilities, including Howyar SysReturn versions before 10.2.02320240919.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation bypasses the Secure Boot chain of trust and permits arbitrary code execution during early boot, before the operating system and its security agents initialize. This can enable bootkit installation, evasion of OS-based security controls, and persistence that potentially survives OS reinstallation if malicious EFI components remain intact. HybridPetya has been reported to exploit this vulnerability to enable pre-OS ransomware execution on unpatched systems.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Where operationally feasible, disable trust in Microsoft's third-party UEFI certificate to prevent execution of the vulnerable signed application; this can affect legitimate third-party boot components. Restrict administrative access and monitor unauthorized changes to the EFI System Partition. Use TPM Measured Boot with independently validated remote attestation to detect boot-chain changes; these mechanisms supplement rather than replace loader fixes and dbx revocations.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade Howyar SysReturn to version 10.2.02320240919 or later, and install the corrected Reloader application for other affected recovery products according to vendor guidance. Apply the latest Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database (dbx) update to revoke vulnerable signed binaries, and verify that the installed database actually contains the relevant revocations. Update recovery and other bootable media to compatible, fixed components. Follow vendor and OS guidance, including updating the trusted signature database (db) before dbx where required, and test deployment to avoid boot failures.

Public exploits

Exploits

2 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis.

View more in app →
UEFI-Security-Research-Howyar-SysReturn-NetCopyThis 15-file repository is UEFI vulnerability research and functional proof-of-concept tooling for Howyar SysReturn NetCopy, centered on the IA-32 NetCopy boot component BOOTia32.efi. It documents that SysReturn v11.2.031 distributed the Microsoft-signed, revoked reloader.efi-derived binary associated with CVE-2024-7344, and attributes the continued IA-32 distribution to CVE-2026-79298. The repository contains manuals and vendor correspondence (00 Manual and 02 Disclosure), extracted-package inventory and boot configurations (01 Binaries), and research documentation plus three Python tools (03 Vulnerability Research/Scripts). Script00 decodes and extracts XOR-obfuscated ALRM payloads; Script01 computes PE Authenticode hashes and can compare results against known revoked hashes or the local UEFI dbx; Script02 is the exploit-enabling component, producing a correctly structured ALRM cloak file from an arbitrary EFI/PE executable. The documented BOOTia32.efi flow searches four ESP paths for cloak data, XOR-decrypts it with 0xB3, and uses a custom RxPE manual PE loader rather than Secure Boot-enforced UEFI image services. The repository is not a network exploit and does not contact command-and-control or target web services. Exploitation is boot-media/ESP based and requires a system that still accepts the revoked signed loader.TheMalwareGuardian · Disclosed Jun 15, 2026 · python · powershell · usb · physical · localOperationalCVE-2024-7344Repository is a research and educational proof-of-concept for CVE-2024-7344, a UEFI Secure Boot bypass caused by improper PE image loading via a custom loader. It is not a network exploit or post-exploitation framework; instead it demonstrates a boot-time trust-boundary failure in which a signed UEFI application manually maps and executes an unsigned PE/COFF image from cloak.dat without using standard LoadImage/StartImage verification paths. Structure: the repo contains EDK II package metadata (.dec, .dsc), two UEFI applications in C, and Markdown documentation. Component01_VulnerableBinary/UefiApplication_Emulate_Custom_PE_Loader.c is the main exploit-relevant code: it locates an existing cloak.dat, then calls a local routine to load and execute the PE payload. This is the core capability that reproduces the vulnerable logic pattern. Component02_Vulnerability/UefiApplication_Explain_Exploitation.c is not an exploit; it is an explanatory/demo application that prints vulnerability metadata and exploitation flow. The README files document prerequisites, affected products, exploitation steps, and mitigation/detection guidance. Main exploit capability: local/boot-level execution of arbitrary unsigned UEFI code by abusing a trusted but vulnerable loader. The attacker must already have privileged access to write to the EFI System Partition and place both the vulnerable loader and crafted cloak.dat. Successful use yields pre-OS code execution, enabling bootkits, persistence, boot-chain tampering, and runtime/boot services access. Because the repo provides a recreated vulnerable loader rather than a turnkey offensive implant, maturity is best classified as POC.TheMalwareGuardian · Disclosed Feb 8, 2026 · c · markdown · local · file · physicalPoC
Exposure surface

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
Cs-GrpNeo Impactapplication
GreenwareGreenguardapplication
HowyarSysreturnapplication
RadixSmart Recoveryapplication
SanfongEz-Back Systemapplication
SignalcomputerHdd Kingapplication
WasayErecoveryrxapplication
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2024-7344 exploited in the wild?
Yes. As of Oct 16, 2026, Mallory has reports of exploitation in the wild.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2024-7344?
Yes. Mallory tracks 2 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2024-7344, the earliest disclosed Feb 8, 2026.
Is there a patch for CVE-2024-7344?
Upgrade Howyar SysReturn to version 10.2.02320240919 or later, and install the corrected Reloader application for other affected recovery products according to vendor guidance. Apply the latest Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database (dbx) update to revoke vulnerable signed binaries, and verify that the installed database actually contains the relevant revocations.
What products are affected by CVE-2024-7344?
Howyar Sysreturn, Wasay Erecoveryrx, Sanfong Ez-Back System, Greenware Greenguard, Signalcomputer Hdd King, and 2 more.
How severe is CVE-2024-7344?
CVE-2024-7344 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 8.2 (High) and an EPSS score of 1.1% (66th percentile) as of Oct 16, 2026.
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, and which detections to deploy tonight.
Exposure mappingQuery your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Threat actor evidenceEvery report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malware7Malware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signatures2YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity56Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.