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CVE-2024-7344 is a Secure Boot bypass vulnerability in the Howyar UEFI Application Reloader, in both 32-bit and 64-bit variants, distributed with multiple system recovery products. The vulnerable application is signed for execution in UEFI environments but uses a custom PE loader rather than the standard UEFI image-loading path. Instead of invoking the normal Secure Boot-enforced loading mechanisms, Reloader reads a payload from a hard-coded location on the EFI System Partition, decodes it, manually maps the PE image into memory, and transfers execution to it. Because the child image is loaded outside the normal UEFI LoadImage and StartImage verification flow, unsigned or otherwise untrusted UEFI code can execute even when Secure Boot is enabled. Affected software includes Howyar SysReturn prior to version 10.2.02320240919, and related recovery utilities that embed the same Reloader component.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This 15-file repository is UEFI vulnerability research and functional proof-of-concept tooling for Howyar SysReturn NetCopy, centered on the IA-32 NetCopy boot component BOOTia32.efi. It documents that SysReturn v11.2.031 distributed the Microsoft-signed, revoked reloader.efi-derived binary associated with CVE-2024-7344, and attributes the continued IA-32 distribution to CVE-2026-79298. The repository contains manuals and vendor correspondence (00 Manual and 02 Disclosure), extracted-package inventory and boot configurations (01 Binaries), and research documentation plus three Python tools (03 Vulnerability Research/Scripts). Script00 decodes and extracts XOR-obfuscated ALRM payloads; Script01 computes PE Authenticode hashes and can compare results against known revoked hashes or the local UEFI dbx; Script02 is the exploit-enabling component, producing a correctly structured ALRM cloak file from an arbitrary EFI/PE executable. The documented BOOTia32.efi flow searches four ESP paths for cloak data, XOR-decrypts it with 0xB3, and uses a custom RxPE manual PE loader rather than Secure Boot-enforced UEFI image services. The repository is not a network exploit and does not contact command-and-control or target web services. Exploitation is boot-media/ESP based and requires a system that still accepts the revoked signed loader.
Repository is a research and educational proof-of-concept for CVE-2024-7344, a UEFI Secure Boot bypass caused by improper PE image loading via a custom loader. It is not a network exploit or post-exploitation framework; instead it demonstrates a boot-time trust-boundary failure in which a signed UEFI application manually maps and executes an unsigned PE/COFF image from cloak.dat without using standard LoadImage/StartImage verification paths. Structure: the repo contains EDK II package metadata (.dec, .dsc), two UEFI applications in C, and Markdown documentation. Component01_VulnerableBinary/UefiApplication_Emulate_Custom_PE_Loader.c is the main exploit-relevant code: it locates an existing cloak.dat, then calls a local routine to load and execute the PE payload. This is the core capability that reproduces the vulnerable logic pattern. Component02_Vulnerability/UefiApplication_Explain_Exploitation.c is not an exploit; it is an explanatory/demo application that prints vulnerability metadata and exploitation flow. The README files document prerequisites, affected products, exploitation steps, and mitigation/detection guidance. Main exploit capability: local/boot-level execution of arbitrary unsigned UEFI code by abusing a trusted but vulnerable loader. The attacker must already have privileged access to write to the EFI System Partition and place both the vulnerable loader and crafted cloak.dat. Successful use yields pre-OS code execution, enabling bootkits, persistence, boot-chain tampering, and runtime/boot services access. Because the repo provides a recreated vulnerable loader rather than a turnkey offensive implant, maturity is best classified as POC.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
71 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A UEFI Secure Boot bypass where a Microsoft-signed recovery-related binary manually loaded and executed an unsigned child PE image, bypassing firmware verification of the child image.
A previously disclosed UEFI Secure Boot bypass vulnerability referenced as related background and defensive guidance.
A specific vulnerability referenced in connection with bootkit/UEFI Secure Boot-related exploitation context.
A UEFI Secure Boot-related vulnerability referenced as relevant background for bootloader/firmware persistence detection on Linux.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.