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CVE-2024-7399 is an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory vulnerability in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server versions earlier than 21.1050. Insufficient restriction of attacker-controlled path input permits an unauthenticated remote attacker to write arbitrary files with SYSTEM authority. Writing a crafted JSP file can enable code execution in the MagicINFO server context.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a fully functional exploit for CVE-2024-7399, a remote code execution vulnerability in Samsung MagicInfo's SWUpdateFileUploader endpoint. The main exploit script (CVE-2024-7399.py) is written in Python and orchestrates the attack by uploading malicious JSP payloads (check.jsp and exploit.jsp) to the target server via a path traversal vulnerability in the SWUpdateFileUploader endpoint. The check.jsp payload is used to verify RCE by echoing a random string, while exploit.jsp provides a more advanced webshell that executes arbitrary commands using Java Nashorn scripting. The exploit supports three main modes: RCE verification, arbitrary file upload, and an interactive command shell. The repository also includes a Java command wrapper template for command execution and a requirements.txt for dependencies. The attack vector is network-based, targeting the exposed MagicInfo service, and the endpoints involved are clearly fingerprintable. The exploit is operational, providing a working RCE chain but requiring the attacker to supply commands interactively.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server (versions 21.1050.0 and below) for unauthenticated remote code execution (CVE-2024-7399). The exploit leverages a path traversal vulnerability in the SWUpdateFileUploader servlet, allowing an attacker to upload a malicious JSP shell to the server's web directory. The module first checks the target's version by querying /MagicInfo/config.js, then uploads the shell via a crafted POST request to /MagicInfo/servlet/SWUpdateFileUploader with a path traversal in the fileName parameter. Finally, it executes the shell by sending a GET request to the uploaded JSP file. The exploit runs with SYSTEM privileges by default. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module, making it easy to use within the Metasploit framework.
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49 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An earlier Samsung MagicINFO vulnerability whose remediation was described as incomplete; it is mentioned only as background for CVE-2025-4632.
An earlier Samsung MagicINFO vulnerability whose remediation was incomplete, leading to the subsequent CVE-2025-4632 issue.
An earlier Samsung MagicINFO vulnerability whose remediation was found to be incomplete, providing the context for the later CVE-2025-4632 flaw discussed as the incident's access vector.
A path traversal vulnerability in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read arbitrary files outside the web root, potentially exposing configuration files, credentials, session tokens, and sensitive content.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.