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CVE-2025-27407 is a remote code execution vulnerability in graphql-ruby affecting versions starting at 1.11.5 and before 1.11.8, 1.12.25, 1.13.24, 2.0.32, 2.1.14, 2.2.17, and 2.3.21. The issue is triggered when a malicious GraphQL schema definition is loaded through GraphQL::Schema.from_introspection or GraphQL::Schema::Loader.load. Systems that ingest schema JSON or introspection results from untrusted sources are vulnerable. This includes deployments that use GraphQL::Client to import external schemas via introspection. In GitLab, the flaw was reachable under certain circumstances through the Direct Transfer feature when an attacker-controlled authenticated user transferred a specially crafted project.
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GraphQL::Schema.from_introspection or GraphQL::Schema::Loader.load on externally supplied schemas until patched. Restrict schema-loading inputs to trusted sources only. In GitLab environments, disable the beta Direct Transfer feature if patching cannot be performed immediately.Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
Repository is a small standalone exploit lab for CVE-2025-27407 against GitLab Direct Transfer / bulk import functionality. It contains two executable components: a Bash lab orchestrator (lab.sh) and a Python PoC (poc_host_port_cmd.py). The Bash script provisions a vulnerable GitLab CE 16.11.8 container with Podman, waits for readiness, enables bulk import and local callback settings through gitlab-rails, and verifies exploitation by checking for a marker file inside the container. The Python PoC is the main exploit: it authenticates to a target GitLab instance, starts an in-process attacker-controlled HTTP server that impersonates a GitLab source instance, and serves crafted API responses including a malicious /api/graphql introspection schema. The schema embeds Ruby code into a field/input name so that when GitLab processes the schema during Direct Transfer import, it executes system(command) in the GitLab runtime. The default command creates /tmp/cve_2025_27407_gitlab_marker, but --cmd allows arbitrary command execution. The exploit is operational rather than just a detector because it performs end-to-end login, import triggering, malicious callback hosting, and payload delivery. The repository appears intended for local lab validation and proof-of-concept exploitation, not as part of a larger framework.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Critical remote code execution vulnerability in the Ruby graphql library that can be exploited by a remote authenticated attacker via a specially crafted project during transfer using the beta Direct Transfer feature.
A vulnerability in the Ruby graphql library affecting GitLab that can lead to remote code execution when an authenticated attacker transfers a maliciously crafted project via the Direct Transfer feature.
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