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A vulnerability in the Linux kernel net/sched subsystem affects the interaction between the CAKE queuing discipline and HTB. When CAKE is configured with an extremely low memlimit, the resulting low buffer_limit can cause packets to be dropped during enqueue. In the vulnerable behavior, cake_enqueue may still return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS after dropping packets from the same tin and flow. This incorrect success status can cause htb_enqueue to invoke htb_activate on an empty child qdisc, triggering a kernel WARNING associated with an empty queue state. The issue is resolved by changing cake_enqueue to return NET_XMIT_CN when packet drops occur after exceeding buffer_limit in the relevant path.
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Linux kernel net/sched vulnerability involving cake_enqueue behavior when past buffer_limit.
A Linux kernel vulnerability in net/sched related to cake_enqueue behavior when past buffer_limit.
A Linux kernel vulnerability in net/sched related to cake_enqueue handling when past buffer_limit.
A Linux kernel flaw in net/sched related to cake_enqueue behavior when past buffer_limit.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.