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CVE-2025-4336 affects the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress. In all versions up to and including 1.2.5, the plugin's set_file() function does not properly validate uploaded file types, allowing arbitrary file upload to the server. Because an attacker can upload files not intended by the application, this can lead to execution of attacker-controlled code if the uploaded file is placed in a web-accessible or otherwise executable location. The issue is described as exploitable by unauthenticated attackers in default configurations when the default password remains set to 1:1, or by attackers who otherwise obtain valid credentials.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a working exploit for CVE-2025-4336, targeting the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce WordPress plugin (versions <= 1.2.5). The exploit leverages a weak authentication mechanism (default credentials and predictable hash) in the plugin's remote management protocol endpoint ('?connector=bridge'). The provided Python script ('cve-2025-4336.py') automates the attack: it authenticates using the default credentials, retrieves a session key, and uploads a PHP web shell ('shell.php') to the server. The shell allows remote command execution via HTTP requests. The README.md provides detailed technical background, including code snippets from the vulnerable plugin, and step-by-step reproduction instructions. The main attack vector is network-based, requiring access to the vulnerable endpoint. The exploit is operational, providing a real payload and demonstrating full compromise of the target system if the default credentials are unchanged.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
5 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.