CVE-2025-4632 is an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory vulnerability in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server before version 21.1052. The flaw allows an attacker to write an arbitrary file outside the intended restricted directory, resulting in arbitrary file write with system-level authority. Based on the available information, the issue is a path traversal-style file write condition affecting server-side file handling in MagicINFO 9 Server.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a small standalone Python exploit for Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server targeting CVE-2025-4632. The repo contains three files: a GPL license, a README with vulnerability description and usage examples, and one executable script, exploit_magicinfo.py. The Python script is the only code file and serves as the main entry point. The exploit’s purpose is to replicate an unauthenticated path traversal file upload against the MagicINFO SWUpdateFileUploader servlet. It constructs a POST request to /MagicInfo/servlet/SWUpdateFileUploader and abuses the fileName parameter with the traversal string ./../../../../../../server/{filename}. Additional parameters deviceType, deviceModelName, and swVer are populated with randomized values to resemble a legitimate device software update request. The request body contains arbitrary attacker-supplied data, allowing the operator to write any chosen file content. After sending the upload request, the script performs a verification GET request to /MagicInfo/{filename}. If the file is reachable, the script reports success and prints a short response snapshot. For non-server-side files it checks whether the uploaded content is reflected; for JSP files it assumes server-side execution may alter the response. This makes the exploit more than a detector: it actively attempts exploitation and confirms impact. The README states the target is Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server before version 21.1052 and describes the issue as arbitrary file write with SYSTEM authority leading to RCE. It also includes multiple example payloads, including a benign JSP execution test and several JSP command shells. Those examples show the intended post-exploitation outcome: remote command execution via uploaded web shells. Although the Python script itself only uploads arbitrary content and verifies accessibility, the documented usage clearly demonstrates how it can be used to achieve RCE by uploading executable JSP payloads. Overall, this is a functional standalone exploit/replication script with operational capability: it automates exploitation of the vulnerable servlet, supports arbitrary file content, and verifies successful placement in a web-accessible path. It is not part of a larger exploit framework.
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39 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A critical path traversal vulnerability in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server (pre-21.1052) that is actively exploited to deploy Mirai botnet.
Improper pathname limitation in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server allows arbitrary file write as system authority.
A critical vulnerability in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server listed as a trending CVE for the week.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.