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CVE-2025-47827 is a Secure Boot bypass vulnerability affecting IGEL OS versions prior to 11. The flaw is in the igel-flash-driver kernel module, which improperly verifies a cryptographic signature during the boot process. Because signature validation is not correctly enforced, a crafted root filesystem can be accepted and mounted from an unverified SquashFS image, breaking the intended Secure Boot chain of trust. Reported analysis also indicates this can be leveraged to boot a vulnerable trusted kernel and then transition to an arbitrary untrusted kernel or root filesystem, enabling persistence below normal operating-system trust controls.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2025-47827, a Secure Boot bypass vulnerability in IGEL OS 10 (before v11). The vulnerability arises from improper cryptographic signature verification in the igel-flash-driver kernel module, allowing an attacker to boot a malicious root filesystem from an unverified SquashFS image. The exploit leverages the kexec syscall to replace the running kernel with an attacker-controlled one, either fetched over HTTP or from local disk, thus bypassing Secure Boot and enabling arbitrary code execution at the kernel level. The repository contains several key files: - `mkdiskimage`: A Bash script that automates the process of downloading the official IGEL UDC3 image, extracting and patching the system image, and assembling a bootable disk image with a custom root filesystem or kernel. - `root/sbin/init`: A shell script used as the init process, which parses kernel command-line arguments, fetches or mounts the specified kernel and initrd (supporting both HTTP and local sources), and uses kexec to boot into the attacker-supplied kernel. - `esp/boot/grub/igel.conf`: A GRUB configuration file that defines menu entries for both network and local kexec booting, specifying parameters for kernel, initrd, and command-line arguments. The exploit is primarily local (requires physical or privileged access to the device to modify the boot process), but it also supports network-based payload delivery (fetching kernel/initrd over HTTP). The PoC demonstrates how an attacker can persistently compromise a device by replacing its kernel, effectively rendering Secure Boot protections ineffective on affected IGEL OS systems. The README provides extensive documentation, impact analysis, and references to related resources.
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A medium-severity Secure Boot bypass vulnerability in IGEL OS versions earlier than 11 caused by improper cryptographic signature validation in igel-flash-driver.
A zero-day vulnerability in Microsoft products that was actively exploited before being patched in October 2025.
Secure Boot bypass in IGEL OS prior to version 11 caused by improper cryptographic signature verification in the igel-flash-driver module, allowing booting/mounting of unverified crafted images.
A Secure Boot bypass vulnerability in IGEL OS before version 11, allowing attackers with physical access to deploy kernel-level rootkits and compromise virtual desktops.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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