CVE-2025-4802 is an untrusted library search-path vulnerability in GNU C Library (glibc) versions 2.27 through 2.38. Statically linked setuid or setgid binaries that invoke dlopen() can incorrectly honor the attacker-controlled LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable and load malicious shared libraries. The call can occur explicitly or indirectly through setlocale() or Name Service Switch functions such as getaddrinfo(). Environment sanitization occurs too late in static-binary initialization, allowing _dl_init_paths() to process an unsafe search path in secure-execution mode. Exploitation enables arbitrary code execution with the binary's elevated privileges.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2025-4802, a vulnerability in GNU C Library (glibc) versions 2.27 to 2.38. The vulnerability allows an attacker to control the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable, causing a statically compiled setuid binary that calls dlopen (directly or indirectly) to load an attacker-supplied shared object. The repository contains three C source files: - `main.c`: The main PoC binary, simulating a setuid root program that loads a shared object (`myso.so`) using dlopen, sets its UID to root, and calls a function from the loaded shared object. - `evil_library/evilso.c`: The malicious shared object, which defines a `hello` function that prints a message and then executes `/bin/sh`, effectively spawning a root shell. - `myso.c`: A benign shared object for demonstration, with a `hello` function that prints a safe message. The exploit demonstrates how an attacker can use a malicious shared object to gain root shell access by exploiting the vulnerable loading mechanism. The attack vector is local, requiring the attacker to control the environment and execute the vulnerable binary. The main fingerprintable endpoints are the use of `/bin/sh` (for privilege escalation) and the loading of `myso.so` via dlopen. The repository is a functional PoC and does not use any exploit frameworks.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
42 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A vulnerability affecting sys-libs/glibc packages covered by Google COS security checks. The reference assigns a critical CVSS v3 base score of 9.8, indicating network attackability, low complexity, no required privileges or user interaction, and high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts. The underlying flaw is not described.
A vulnerability affecting glibc packages on CentOS Linux 8.4, addressed by TuxCare advisory CENTOS8.4:CLSA-2025:1750416241. The plugin reports a CVSS v3 base score of 7.8, with local access, no required privileges, user interaction, and high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts. Exploits and patches are available. The content does not describe the underlying flaw; Nessus identifies affected installations using self-reported version information rather than testing exploitation.
A high-severity vulnerability affecting the sys-libs/glibc package in Google Container-Optimized OS (COS), remediated by updating glibc and related packages to version 18867.90.32 or later.
An Important-severity vulnerability identified as CVE-2025-4802, covered by a CentOS 8.5 local security-check plugin.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.