CVE-2025-5058 is an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress. According to the provided content, the issue is caused by missing file type validation in the set_image() function in all versions up to and including 1.2.5. Because uploaded files are not properly restricted to safe types, an attacker can upload arbitrary files to the affected server. In environments where the uploaded file is web-accessible and executable by the server, this can lead to remote code execution. The issue is described as exploitable by unauthenticated attackers in default configurations when the default password remains set to 1:1, or otherwise when an attacker has obtained valid credentials.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a working exploit for CVE-2025-5058, targeting eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin versions 1.2.5 and below. The exploit leverages a weak authentication mechanism (default credentials and predictable hash) on the 'connector=bridge' endpoint to obtain a session key. Using this session key, it abuses the 'set_image' task to upload arbitrary files, including a PHP web shell, to the server. The exploit script (CVE-2025-5058.py) is a standalone Python file that automates the attack: it authenticates, uploads the shell (using a path traversal in the image_id parameter), and demonstrates command execution via the uploaded shell. The README provides detailed technical background, including the vulnerable flow, default credential usage, and example output. The main attack vector is network-based, requiring access to the exposed management endpoint. The exploit is operational, providing a real, working payload (PHP web shell) and clear instructions for use. No detection scripts or fake elements are present.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
7 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.