A denial-of-service vulnerability in Socomec DIRIS Digiware M-70 firmware 1.6.9 exists in the Modbus TCP / Modbus RTU over TCP handling logic. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specific sequence of Modbus RTU over TCP messages to TCP port 503 using function code 0x06 (Write Single Register) to force a configuration change that leaves the device in a persistent denial-of-service state. The documented trigger sequence writes: (1) register 58112 with value 1000 (indicating a configuration change will follow), (2) register 29440 with a value corresponding to the new Modbus address, and (3) register 57856 with value 161 to commit the configuration change. After the commit, the device enters a DoS condition.
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A denial-of-service vulnerability in the Socomec DIRIS M-70 industrial gateway (firmware 1.6.9) reachable over Modbus TCP or Modbus RTU over TCP that can be triggered remotely without authentication, rendering the device inoperable.
Denial-of-service vulnerability in the Socomec DIRIS M-70 gateway’s Modbus protocol handling, discovered via emulation-based coverage-guided fuzzing.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.