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CVE-2026-0049 is a critical denial-of-service vulnerability in the Android Framework affecting Android 14, 15, 16, and 16-qpr2. The flaw is located in the onHeaderDecoded method of LocalImageResolver.java and arises from resource exhaustion, allowing an attacker to trigger a persistent local denial of service. Exploitation does not require user interaction or additional execution privileges.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository is a real PoC/research package for CVE-2026-0049, an Android zero-click denial-of-service in the Adobe DNG SDK bundled with AOSP. The exploit is file-based: it crafts a malicious .dng whose OpcodeList2 (TIFF tag 51009) contains a MapTable opcode with attacker-controlled AreaSpec values Plane=0xFFFFFF00 and Planes=0x200. When Android's system RAW decoder reaches dng_opcode_MapTable::ProcessArea, the expression Plane()+Planes() overflows uint32; because vulnerable Android builds compile libdng_sdk.so with integer sanitizer checks, this causes an abort and SIGABRT rather than memory corruption. The repository explicitly argues this is DoS only, not RCE, due to an additional real bounds check on plane < buffer.Planes(). Structure: two long-form markdown articles (Italian and English) explain root cause, exploit path, and reproduction; evidence/ contains a real crash backtrace and binary-hardening analysis from a Pixel 9; harness/ contains a native Android C harness that invokes AImageDecoder on a supplied DNG and a C++ XMP stub for building dng_validate on desktop; poc/ contains four generators/utilities. The main exploit logic is in poc/inject_opcode.py, which injects a malicious OpcodeList2 into an existing valid DNG using append-only IFD relocation so existing offsets remain stable. poc/gen_base_dng.py creates a valid Bayer DNG with sufficient color metadata for SkRawCodec acceptance. poc/make_dng.py and poc/make_poc_dng.py are standalone DNG builders that can emit malicious or benign control files. Capabilities: generate malicious DNGs, generate benign comparison samples, inject opcode payloads into valid DNGs, and reproduce the crash both on Android devices and on desktop with dng_validate plus sanitizer instrumentation. The exploit does not include a network delivery component; delivery is implicit through any channel that causes Android to thumbnail or decode a DNG (file manager, media indexing, MMS/RCS attachment preview, Bluetooth/Nearby Share, etc.). The included harness demonstrates the exact vulnerable path AImageDecoder -> SkRawCodec -> libdng_sdk.so.
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9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A critical zero-interaction local denial-of-service vulnerability in the Android Framework affecting Android 14, 15, 16, and 16-qpr2.
A critical Android Security Bulletin vulnerability patched by Samsung in the April 2026 Security Maintenance Release.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.