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HighExploited in the wildCISA KEVPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2026-0257: Authentication Bypass in PAN-OS GlobalProtect Portal and Gateway

Published May 13, 2026 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days120 mentions · peak 31 in a dayToday
CVSS7.8High · v4
EPSS95.6%100th percentile
CISA KEVYesAdded May 29, 2026
In the wildActivePer CISA KEV
Vendors
Palo Alto NetworksSiemens
IdentifiersCVE-2026-0257CWE-287

CVE-2026-0257 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the GlobalProtect portal and gateway components of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS and affected Prisma Access deployments. Exploitation requires Authentication Override cookies to be enabled with a vulnerable certificate configuration. An unauthenticated remote attacker can forge authentication-override cookies to bypass authentication-related security restrictions, including MFA, and establish an unauthorized VPN connection. Panorama and Cloud NGFW are unaffected.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation provides unauthorized access to network resources reachable through the VPN. This foothold can facilitate internal reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, data exfiltration, and ransomware staging, depending on network segmentation and downstream access controls. Exploitation has been associated with Qilin and INC ransomware operators. The vulnerability itself does not establish arbitrary code execution or administrative control of the appliance.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Pending patching, disable Authentication Override by clearing the options to generate and accept Authentication Override cookies in both GlobalProtect portal and gateway configurations. Alternatively, generate a new certificate used exclusively for Authentication Override cookies, store it securely, and do not reuse it for the portal, gateway, other features, or users. Restrict VPN exposure where feasible, enforce least-privilege segmentation for VPN clients, and monitor GlobalProtect authentication and session logs for unauthorized connections. MFA alone does not prevent exploitation.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade to an applicable vendor-fixed release. Fixed PAN-OS release targets include 12.1.7, 11.2.12, 11.1.15, and 10.2.18-h6; branch-specific fixed hotfixes are also available, including 11.2.10-h7. Upgrade Prisma Access 10.2 to 10.2.10-h36 or later and Prisma Access 11.2 to 11.2.7-h13 or later. Confirm the appropriate fixed release or hotfix against the vendor release matrix, and migrate unsupported releases to a supported fixed version. Investigate suspected unauthorized VPN sessions and invalidate exposed credentials or sessions where compromise is identified.

Public exploits

Exploits

5 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis. Hidden: 6 rejected by Mallory's analysis as not a working exploit; 1 not yet analyzed, such as Exploit-DB entries.

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CVE-2026-0257This repository is a small standalone Python proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-0257 affecting Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect on PAN-OS and Prisma Access. The repo contains three files: a README with vulnerability background and usage guidance, a requirements file, and a single executable script `exploit_poc.py` that implements the exploit logic. The exploit is clearly offensive rather than merely diagnostic. Its core capability is remote unauthenticated authentication bypass via forged GlobalProtect authentication override cookies. The script first connects to the target HTTPS service and extracts the full TLS certificate chain. It supports both modern Python behavior (`get_unverified_chain`) and an older fallback that manually captures and parses raw TLS 1.2 handshake records using `ssl.MemoryBIO` to recover the server certificates. It then iterates over each certificate/public key in the chain and attempts to construct an encrypted authentication override cookie for an attacker-supplied username and related client metadata. After generating candidate cookies, the script tests them against GlobalProtect web endpoints. The README explicitly identifies `/ssl-vpn/login.esp` for gateway validation, and the visible code shows separate handling for gateway and portal contexts. Success conditions are based on response content: for gateway mode, acceptance is inferred from a successful login-style response; for portal mode, acceptance is inferred from XML/JNLP-like `<argument>` elements containing the forged username and additional session/configuration data. When successful, the script prints the forged cookie and may also display extracted auth token, username, and gateway values. Operationally, the exploit supports single-target and multi-target scanning via `--target` or `--target-file`, custom port selection, arbitrary username selection, and customization of cookie fields such as domain, host ID, client OS, and client IP. This makes it more than a minimal PoC, but it is still a standalone script with a fixed exploit path rather than a fully modular framework payload, so OPERATIONAL is the best maturity fit. The exploit requires a specific vulnerable configuration: GlobalProtect authentication override must be enabled, and the certificate used for cookie encryption/decryption must be reused by the HTTPS service or otherwise share the same public key. If that condition is not met, the script reports that no key in the chain produced a valid cookie. Notable implementation details from the visible code include direct socket/TLS handling, certificate parsing with `cryptography.x509`, likely RSA public-key encryption for the forged cookie, HTTP requests via `urllib`, regex parsing of portal responses, and console output helpers from the `frint` package. No destructive behavior, persistence, or post-exploitation payloads are present; the main outcome is unauthorized authenticated access through a forged bearer-like cookie.bolubey · Disclosed Jun 1, 2026 · python · markdown · network · webOperationalCVE-2026-0257Repository contains a single Python exploit script and a detailed README. The main file, CVE-2026-0257.py, is a standalone Palo Alto GlobalProtect authentication bypass exploit/scanner for CVE-2026-0257. It is not part of a common exploitation framework. The script supports scanning one target, multiple targets, or targets from a file, and uses threading for concurrent scans. Core capability: the exploit performs unauthenticated user impersonation by forging a GlobalProtect pre-authentication cookie using only the target server's publicly exposed TLS certificate. The code first opens a raw TCP connection to the target on port 443, sends a handcrafted TLS ClientHello, receives the server handshake, extracts DER-encoded certificates, walks ASN.1 structures to locate SubjectPublicKeyInfo, and recovers the RSA modulus/exponent. It then builds a cookie plaintext for an attacker-chosen username, applies PKCS#1 v1.5 style padding, encrypts with the extracted RSA public key, encodes the result, and submits it to the GlobalProtect login endpoint /ssl-vpn/login.esp. Success is determined from HTTP 200 responses and XML/status parsing, with testing performed in both gateway and portal contexts. Repository structure is minimal: one operational Python PoC plus documentation. The README explains the vulnerability mechanics, TLS handshake parsing, ASN.1 extraction, RSA cookie forgery, and expected impact (unauthenticated VPN access / arbitrary user impersonation). This is an exploit rather than a pure detector because it actively forges authentication material and attempts login bypass. Maturity is OPERATIONAL: the payload is built and used automatically, but it is a standalone PoC rather than a reusable framework module.tushargurav28 · Disclosed Jun 3, 2026 · python · markdown · network · webOperationalCVE-2026-0257Small repository containing a single Python proof-of-concept exploit (poc.py), a minimal README, and a license. The script is a standalone network exploit for CVE-2026-0257 targeting Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect. Its structure shows custom low-level TLS and ASN.1 parsing helpers rather than use of high-level libraries: it builds a ClientHello manually, connects to the target over TLS, parses certificate records from the handshake, extracts an RSA public key from the presented certificate, and uses that key material to forge a GlobalProtect portal-userauthcookie for a chosen username. It then submits the forged cookie to both gateway and portal validation paths and checks returned content for success indicators. The exploit is more than a detector because it generates and prints a reusable forged auth token and actively attempts authentication bypass. Based on the visible code, there are no hardcoded external C2 endpoints or third-party callback URLs; targeting is operator-supplied at runtime. The repository is therefore a focused operational PoC for unauthorized access/authentication bypass against vulnerable GlobalProtect deployments.Ez4rd1x1 · Disclosed Jun 15, 2026 · python · markdown · network · webOperationalCVE-2026-0257-GlobalProtect-BypassSmall standalone Python exploit repository with 4 files: a README, one main exploit script (exploit_poc.py), requirements.txt, and .gitignore. The repository targets CVE-2026-0257, described as a Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS / Prisma Access GlobalProtect authentication bypass via forged authentication override cookies. The exploit script is the operational core. It accepts a single target or a target list, connects to the target over TLS, retrieves the presented HTTPS certificate, extracts the RSA public key, constructs a cookie payload containing username/domain/client metadata and an expiry timestamp, encrypts that payload with RSA OAEP, base64-encodes it, and then submits it to GlobalProtect login endpoints for validation. It tests both gateway and portal contexts using /ssl-vpn/login.esp and /global-protect/login.esp. The script disables certificate validation when connecting, supports custom port, username, domain, client OS, client IP, timeout, verbosity, context selection, and optional output file writing. Primary exploit capability: unauthenticated network-based auth bypass testing against exposed GlobalProtect services. If the target is misconfigured/vulnerable such that the HTTPS certificate is reused for auth override cookie encryption, the forged cookie may be accepted, potentially granting unauthorized VPN access as the chosen username. This is more than a detector because it actively generates and submits forged authentication material. Repository structure is simple and purpose-built: README provides vulnerability background, affected versions, usage examples, and mitigation guidance; requirements.txt lists Python dependencies (cryptography, urllib3, frint); exploit_poc.py is the only code file and clear entry point. Based on the visible code, this is a standalone PoC/operational exploit rather than a framework module.amnsecurity · Disclosed Jul 8, 2026 · python · markdown · network · webOperationalCVE-2026-0257This repository is a small standalone proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-0257 affecting Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect. It contains one Python exploit script, forge_cookie.py, and a README describing usage and expected behavior. The exploit’s core capability is authentication bypass via forged GlobalProtect auth override cookies. The script connects directly to the target’s HTTPS service, forces a TLS 1.2 handshake, captures raw handshake records, parses the Certificate message, and extracts every certificate in the presented chain. It then derives public keys from those certificates and iteratively uses each key to construct candidate authentication override cookies for a chosen identity (default user: admin, with optional domain, host ID, client OS, and client IP fields). After generating each candidate cookie, the script sends requests to GlobalProtect portal and/or gateway web endpoints over HTTPS to determine whether the forged cookie is accepted. Success is inferred from returned XML/JNLP content, such as <status>Success</status> or <argument> elements containing the requested username and connection details. When successful, the script prints the forged cookie and may also display extracted values such as auth token, username, and gateway information. Repository structure is minimal: - Readme.md: vulnerability description, command-line usage, and sample successful exploitation output. - forge_cookie.py: full exploit implementation, including TLS certificate-chain extraction, certificate parsing, public-key handling, cookie forging, HTTP(S) request logic, response parsing, and CLI argument handling. This is not merely a detector: it actively attempts exploitation by forging and replaying authentication cookies. However, it is still a PoC/operational script rather than a framework-integrated or heavily weaponized tool. The exploit is network/web-based, targets exposed GlobalProtect services over HTTPS, and is intended to validate whether a target accepts forged auth override cookies derived from public keys in its TLS certificate chain.sfewer-r7 · Disclosed May 29, 2026 · python · markdown · network · webPoC
Exposure surface

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
Palo Alto NetworksPan-Osoperating_system
Palo Alto NetworksPrisma Accessapplication
SiemensRuggedcom Ape1808 Firmwareoperating_system
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2026-0257 exploited in the wild?
Yes. As of Nov 16, 2026, Mallory has reports of exploitation in the wild, and CISA added it to KEV on May 29, 2026.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2026-0257?
Yes. Mallory tracks 5 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2026-0257, the earliest disclosed May 29, 2026.
Is there a patch for CVE-2026-0257?
Upgrade to an applicable vendor-fixed release. Fixed PAN-OS release targets include 12.1.7, 11.2.12, 11.1.15, and 10.2.18-h6; branch-specific fixed hotfixes are also available, including 11.2.10-h7.
What products are affected by CVE-2026-0257?
Palo Alto Networks Pan-Os, Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access, and Siemens Ruggedcom Ape1808 Firmware.
How severe is CVE-2026-0257?
CVE-2026-0257 has a CVSS v4 score of 7.8 (High) and an EPSS score of 95.6% (100th percentile) as of Nov 16, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

625 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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dragos blogNews · Nov 16, 2026Industrial Ransomware Analysis for Q3 2026 - DragosAn authentication bypass in Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect exploited by Qilin affiliates to establish VPN sessions. Subsequent activity included credential theft, lateral movement, and data exfiltration. Exploitation began in Q2, and the report anticipates continued abuse of unpatched exposed instances.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Nov 11, 2026New GhostFrame Malware Lets Hackers Hijack VMware ESXi VMs and Steal Windows Credentials | Cryptika CybersecurityAn authentication-bypass vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect that allows unauthorized VPN sessions without valid credentials or MFA. The article describes exploitation followed by movement into the virtualization layer and theft of domain controller credentials directly from a virtual disk. It notes similarities to GhostFrame activity but does not establish that GhostFrame or Settra exploited this vulnerability. Fixes reportedly became available in May 2026.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Nov 11, 2026New GhostFrame Malware Lets Hackers Hijack VMware ESXi VMs and Steal Windows CredentialsAn authentication-bypass vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect that allows VPN sessions without valid credentials or MFA. The article reports exploitation followed, in one case, by movement into the virtualization layer and theft of domain controller credentials from a virtual disk. It notes similarities to GhostFrame activity but does not establish that GhostFrame or Settra used this vulnerability.Read more ↗kaspersky blogNews · Nov 10, 2026Key benefits of Zero Trust Network Access over corporate VPN access | Kaspersky official blogAn authentication vulnerability in Palo Alto GlobalProtect reportedly exploited by Qilin ransomware operators. The article cites it as an example of malicious activity that can resemble legitimate employee access when VPN telemetry is limited.Read more ↗
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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, and which detections to deploy tonight.
Exposure mappingQuery your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Threat actor evidence55Every report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malware56Malware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signatures1YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity153Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.