Local Privilege Escalation in .NET dotnet-watch Temporary File Handling
CVE-2026-114155 is a time-of-check/time-of-use race condition in the .NET SDK's dotnet-watch hot-reload workflow and the separately restored Microsoft.DotNet.HotReload.Watch.Aspire tool. The vulnerable BuildAsync implementation derives a temporary solution filename from Path.GetTempFileName() without reserving the derived name, writes the solution document, and closes its stream before MSBuild consumes it. A local attacker may pre-create or replace the temporary file, or modify it during the interval before consumption, to influence the subsequent build and execute code with the build process's permissions. Affected SDK branches include .NET 10.0.3xx, 10.0.4xx, and 11.0.1xx prereleases. The vulnerability covers Linux and macOS; exclusion of Windows assumes a temporary directory private to the current user.
What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
Successful exploitation can execute attacker-controlled build instructions with another user's permissions, exposing that user's data and resources to unauthorized access or modification and potentially disrupting availability. Privilege escalation is bounded by the permissions of the victim dotnet-watch process; administrative or root execution is not an inherent outcome. The vulnerability has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5, reflecting high attack complexity, required user interaction, and potentially high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
No vendor-specified interim workaround is identified. Defense-in-depth measures include using an owner-only temporary directory for the dotnet-watch process, isolating temporary storage with systemd PrivateTmp where applicable, and avoiding execution of development builds with elevated privileges. Linux fs.protected_regular=2 can restrict some pre-created-file attack paths, but it should not be treated as a complete mitigation. These measures do not replace installing the fixed SDK or tool.
Patch, then assume compromise.
Upgrade affected .NET SDK 10.0.3xx and 10.0.4xx installations to 10.0.404, and affected 11.0.1xx prerelease installations to 11.0.100, then restart dotnet-watch. Update every affected SDK installation, including SDKs supplied through Visual Studio. Verify that SDK selection and roll-forward settings actually select a fixed SDK; installing a fixed SDK or updating only an application runtime does not replace or deselect vulnerable SDK tools. Separately restored Microsoft.DotNet.HotReload.Watch.Aspire copies require their own update to the applicable fixed release, 10.0.404 or 11.0.100, followed by package restoration and restart of the consuming process. The fix creates temporary solution files exclusively within an owner-only directory and retains the file stream with read-only sharing while the build consumes it.
No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.