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CriticalPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2026-126170: Unauthenticated Code Execution via JSON Injection in Fortinet JRPC API

Published Nov 11, 2026 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days21 mentions · peak 8 in a dayToday
CVSS9.8Critical · v3.1
EPSS0.63%51st percentile
CISA KEVNoNot listed
In the wildNonePublic exploit, no exploitation reported
Vendor
Fortinet
IdentifiersCVE-2026-126170CWE-116 · Improper Encoding or Escaping of…

CVE-2026-126170 is an improper output encoding or escaping vulnerability in the JSON-RPC API of Fortinet FortiAnalyzer, FortiManager, and related deployments. When the JSON API is enabled, an unauthenticated attacker can send specially crafted HTTP requests that may trigger JSON injection and execute unauthorized code or commands. Affected versions include FortiAnalyzer and FortiManager 7.6.0–7.6.7 and 8.0.0–8.0.2; FortiAnalyzer Cloud and FortiManager Cloud 7.6.0–7.6.7 and 8.0.1–8.0.2; and FortiAnalyzer-BigData 7.6.0–7.6.2. FortiSASE-Sovereign is also affected. The JSON API is disabled by default. The vulnerability has a CVSS v3.0 base score of 9.8.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation may permit unauthenticated remote code or command execution on the affected system, compromising confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Denial of service is also identified as a potential impact. The execution privilege level is not specified.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Disable the JSON API on every administrative profile where it is enabled using: config system admin profile; edit <profile name>; set rpc-permit none; end. The API is disabled by default. Restrict network access to management services to trusted administrative systems as an additional exposure-reduction measure. No virtual patch is listed.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade affected FortiAnalyzer, FortiAnalyzer Cloud, FortiManager, and FortiManager Cloud 7.6 installations to version 7.6.8 or later. Upgrade affected 8.0 installations to version 8.0.3 or later, and FortiAnalyzer-BigData 7.6 installations to version 7.6.3 or later. Fortinet advisory FG-IR-26-219 identifies 8.0.3 and FortiAnalyzer-BigData 7.6.3 as upcoming; verify availability and use the workaround until the applicable release is available. Migrate affected FortiSASE-Sovereign 25, 25.3, and 25.4 installations to a fixed release. For FortiSASE-Sovereign 26.2, Fortinet states that remediation occurred before release and no customer action is required, although its affected-version table conflicts with that statement; confirm applicability with Fortinet.

Public exploits

Exploits

3 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis. Hidden: 1 rejected by Mallory's analysis as not a working exploit.

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CVE-2026-126170The supplied tree is a standalone, containerized vulnerability-class laboratory, not a demonstrated exploit against genuine Fortinet firmware. It contains 27 files: three Python programs, two shell scripts, a Makefile, two Containerfiles, documentation and metadata, and 14 captured evidence files. The eight code/build files implement the PoC, synthetic target, command shims, and Podman orchestration. Several important file bodies are truncated in the supplied content, limiting complete source review. poc/poc.py uses only the Python standard library and exposes check, exploit, probe, mitigation, and 0day modes. It sends crafted JSON-RPC requests without requiring credentials, inserts a correlation-key payload into request values, examines response structure, and uses shared marker files to confirm shell execution. Testing covers get/set/add/delete/exec, parameter and value variations, and alternate transport forms. Even check mode sends an active command-execution payload; this is not a passive detector. lab/fmgr_jrpc.py explicitly models vulnerable and patched behavior. The vulnerable mode concatenates recovered input into generated command lines and JSON responses and uses a shell command sink. The fixed mode applies destination-specific encoding and avoids shell execution. Two additional modes simulate rpc-permit none with HTTP 403 and an absent API with HTTP 404. The command interpreter and verb scripts are laboratory shims, not vendor implementations. Makefile and run-lab.sh create four target containers and a separate PoC container on an internal network, with shared result storage. Captured evidence reports command execution and response-key injection in the vulnerable model, including uid=0 output from its container. The 55-case patched probe and 72-case extended sweep report no findings; the vulnerable probe reports 17 finding cases, including 14 execution cases. These results establish behavior of the supplied model only. Shared-file verification is not an independent remote execution oracle for an unrelated appliance, and the fixed-model sweep does not establish the absence of real-product bypasses or new vulnerabilities. The repository attributes the issue to CVE-2026-126170 and advisory FG-IR-26-219. Its CVE, advisory, affected-version, severity, and patch claims have not been independently verified here. The FortiSASE-Sovereign 26.2 affected/fixed entries are internally inconsistent. No malicious callback endpoint or exfiltration destination is evident; documentation URLs are references rather than exploit traffic. The cleanup commands remove laboratory containers/results and are not, by themselves, evidence of a fake exploit. The git reference and archive size were not supplied; empty ref and size_bytes=0 represent unavailable metadata.googlesky · Disclosed Nov 12, 2026 · python · bash · network · webOperationalfortinet-exploitsThe supplied repository listing contains 22 files: a root README and license, plus five CVE-named directories, each containing README.md, LICENSE, poc.py, and exploit.py. The ten standalone Python entry points use primarily standard-library HTTP, TLS, socket, argument-parsing, JSON, and concurrency facilities. PHP and Bash appear as embedded payload languages. No recognized exploitation-framework integration, dependency manifest, or test suite is listed. Many source bodies are explicitly truncated, limiting validation of protocol handling and payload construction. The original repository URL, git reference, and archive size were not supplied; empty strings and zero represent unavailable metadata, not a measured archive size. The FortiSIEM pair claims unauthenticated gRPC filename traversal on TCP/27918. Visible constants specify a text-file write test and a PHP webshell at ../../web/ng/wp-cron.php, accessed through /ng/wp-cron.php. The exploit tail supports command execution and a Bash reverse shell and invokes escalation and persistence helpers. Their implementations and the actual gRPC request construction are omitted. The FortiSandbox authentication-bypass PoC defines privileged REST paths, encoded and duplicate-slash variants, and localhost/proxy-header spoofing combinations. Its companion advertises administrator creation and exposes command-execution, reverse-shell, and post-exploitation call sites, but the complete privileged requests are not visible. The FortiClient pair checks service exposure and CORS behavior on TCP/9191, supports threaded target lists and JSON output, and advertises an HTTP server delivering a cross-origin payload at /payload, normally on port 8080. Permissive CORS alone does not establish operating-system command execution; the supplied excerpts omit the privileged API calls and browser payload needed to substantiate that claim. The FortiManager/FortiAnalyzer pair targets /jsonrpc, normally over HTTPS/443, with scanning, information collection, configurable commands, and threaded execution attempts. The README illustrates command substitution in an SMTP-test server field, but the actual injection builder is truncated. An accessible JSON-RPC endpoint is not by itself evidence of unauthenticated RCE. The most completely visible attack routine is the FortiSandbox command-injection PoC: it sends a semicolon-containing jid value, redirects output to /tmp/out_39808.txt, and then retrieves /ng/test.txt. No connection between those files is shown. It treats any nonempty HTTP 200 response as success without validating command-specific output, creating a substantial false-positive risk. Documentation instead describes pipe injection and /web/ng/test.txt. Additional inconsistencies include command-injection modules labeled as path traversal, conflicting affected-version text, incompatible README command-line examples, and differing advisory identifiers. The collection contains exploit-intended code and concrete payloads rather than only detection scripts, but operational maturity here describes implementation intent, not demonstrated success. There is insufficient evidence to label it deliberately fake; equally, none of the claimed CVE assignments, advisories, patch versions, root-execution assertions, CISA KEV inclusion, or in-the-wild exploitation claims is independently established by the supplied material. No fixed external exfiltration or callback infrastructure is visible.Ghost-Bx1 · Disclosed Nov 16, 2026 · python · php · network · web · browserOperationalcve-2026-126170-fortimanager-jsonrpc-rceThe repository contains four files: a public-domain LICENSE, a Portuguese README, and two standalone Python scripts. exploit.py is the intended command-execution entry point; poc.py is the endpoint-checking companion. Both use Python standard-library imports, including urllib, argparse, json, and concurrent.futures, and contain substantial duplicated ANSI banner code. No exploit framework is identified. The README alleges CVE-2026-126170, an unauthenticated JSON-RPC command-injection vulnerability affecting FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer when the API is enabled. Its example sends an exec request to /jsonrpc and places $(id) in the server field of the internal /sys/api/smtptest operation. This is an alleged shell-injection mechanism carried by valid JSON, rather than demonstrated manipulation of JSON syntax. The visible exploit control flow invokes tentar_execucao with the selected command, optionally calls obter_info, processes target files concurrently with a default of 10 threads, and writes JSON results. The PoC invokes scan_alvo and counts results marked endpoint_acessivel. Target-file parsing accepts host:port entries and skips blank or comment lines. Local input and output filenames are operator-supplied, not fixed endpoints. The documentation's private IP addresses and sample hostnames are examples, while GitHub, badge, licensing, and vendor links are attribution or reference material rather than demonstrated exploit destinations. Important limitation: both Python listings are explicitly truncated where the substantive networking, payload construction, and response interpretation would appear. Consequently, successful exploitation, reliable detection, authentication bypass, and command-output retrieval cannot be established. The CVE assignment, CVSS 9.8 rating, and claimed FortiManager 8.0.3+ fix are repository assertions without independent corroboration in the supplied material. No visible code establishes a reverse shell, persistence, exfiltration destination, or malicious local side effect, but the omitted sections cannot be assessed. The repository is classified as an intended exploit rather than detection-only; that does not certify validity, and a fake-exploit determination is not supported. Maturity remains unknown because the essential implementation is unavailable. The original repository URL, Git reference, and archive size were not supplied; empty strings and zero represent those unavailable metadata values. The four listed file sizes total 27,261 bytes, which is not a verified archive size.Ghost-Bx1 · Disclosed Nov 11, 2026 · python · network · webPoC
Exposure surface

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
FortinetFortianalyzeroperating_system
FortinetFortianalyzer-Bigdataapplication
FortinetFortimanageroperating_system
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2026-126170 exploited in the wild?
As of Nov 16, 2026, Mallory has no reports of CVE-2026-126170 being exploited in the wild. It is not listed in CISA KEV.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2026-126170?
Yes. Mallory tracks 3 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2026-126170, the earliest disclosed Nov 11, 2026.
Is there a patch for CVE-2026-126170?
Upgrade affected FortiAnalyzer, FortiAnalyzer Cloud, FortiManager, and FortiManager Cloud 7.6 installations to version 7.6.8 or later. Upgrade affected 8.0 installations to version 8.0.3 or later, and FortiAnalyzer-BigData 7.6 installations to version 7.6.3 or later.
What products are affected by CVE-2026-126170?
Fortinet Fortianalyzer, Fortinet Fortianalyzer-Bigdata, and Fortinet Fortimanager.
How severe is CVE-2026-126170?
CVE-2026-126170 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8 (Critical) and an EPSS score of 0.63% (51st percentile) as of Nov 16, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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krcert kisaNews · Nov 16, 2026Fortinet 제품 보안 업데이트 권고 > 보안공지 > 알림마당 : KISA 보호나라&KrCERT/CCImproper output encoding or escaping affecting FortiAnalyzer, FortiAnalyzer Cloud, FortiAnalyzer-BigData, FortiManager, and FortiManager Cloud. FortiAnalyzer-BigData is fixed in 7.6.3; the other listed products are fixed in 7.6.8 and 8.0.3 or later within their respective branches.Read more ↗hawkeye blogNews · Nov 13, 2026Weekly Threat Landscape Digest - Week 46 - HawkEyeNamed in a collection of Fortinet vulnerabilities involving code execution, authentication bypass, and other weaknesses. The digest does not identify which individual issue or product maps to this CVE.Read more ↗ghsa syntheticNews · Nov 12, 2026GHSA-rm98-fc32-9ggjAn improper output encoding or escaping vulnerability affecting multiple Fortinet management and analytics products. A specially crafted HTTP request may enable an unauthenticated attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands. The advisory does not report exploitation activity, exploit availability, patches, or mitigations.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Nov 11, 2026Critical Fortinet Flaws Expose FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer to Remote Code Execution Without Login | Cryptika CybersecurityCritical JSON injection vulnerability in the FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer JSON-RPC API, rated CVSS 9.8. Exploitation requires the JSON API to be enabled and can permit unauthenticated code or command execution. Updates are discussed, but version 8.0.3 was still forthcoming for the 8.0 branch. Disabling unused JSON API access with 'set rpc-permit none' reduces exposure.Read more ↗
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Exposure mappingQuery your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Threat actor evidenceEvery report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malwareMalware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity10Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.